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1. The term "good whiskey" is taken from comment i to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which states: "Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some
people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous
amount of flisel oil, is unreasonably dangerous." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
cmt. i (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
It may be that the drafters of the Restatement had a little fun choosing the term "good" to
describe some whiskey. The American Law Institute Proceedings reflect that the drafters laughed
at William Prosser's suggestion that whiskey is one of "anumber of products which, even though
not defective, are in fact dangerous to the consumer." 38 A.L.I. PROc. 87-88 (1961) (statement
of William L. Prosser). It would have been hard for the drafters of the Restatement to have
chosen a less precise term than "good" to define whiskey that is not defective. The term "good"
can mean "desirable," "[s]uperior to the average," "[o]f high quality," or "[p]leasant;
enjoyable." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 567 (2d ed. 1982). What is normally
referred to as "good whiskey" is whiskey that is of excellent quality, the service of which would
be a mark of a superior host. It is a term that would engender within a whiskey drinker a feeling
of warmth. Certainly no one could find "good whiskey" to be defective. Other definitions of
"good," such as "[b]eneficial," "[s]afe," and even "[o]f moral excellence," id., if used to
describe whiskey, hide the great risks that accompany the consumption of any whiskey. It is
questionable whether a product that creates so many costs to society is good in that sense. See,
e.g., infra part IV.C.I.a (discussing the costs of alcohol to society). Indeed, if an alcohol

manufacturer were to assert that its product was good, consumers might claim that it created
unrealistic safety expectations about its product.
A complete reading of the quoted portion of the Restatement's comment, supra, reveals that
what is meant is not good in the sense of "[s]uperior" or "safe" but good in the sense of "[n]ot
spoiled or ruined." See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra, 567. This Article will
use the term "good whiskey" in that sense.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Alcohol-related traffic accidents kill and seriously injure thousands of
innocent bystanders each year. 2 Drunk drivers are subject to liability for
these losses, but many drunk drivers are not financially responsible and are
either uninsured or underinsured. Some jurisdictions hold servers of alcohol

responsible if they negligently serve an intoxicated person who causes an
accident, 3 but in many cases there is not a negligent server. Courts have not
held alcohol manufacturers subject to liability to injured bystanders. 4 This
Article will consider the possibility that courts or legislatures might make
manufacturers of alcohol and other dangerous hedonic products subject to
liability for injuries to innocent bystanders. Manufacturer liability may be
justified both as a matter of corrective justice' and because of the consequenc-

2. The United States Department of Transportation estimates that in 1985 alcohol-related
traffic accidents killed 7400 persons who had not been drinking. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DRUNK DRIVING FACTS (1986) [hereinafter DRUNK
DRIVING FACTS], cited in Willard G. Manning et al., The Taxes of Sin:Do Smokers andDrinkers
Pay Their Way?, 261 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1604, 1608 (1989)).
3. By 1988, 30 states had enacted dram shop acts that subjected commercial distributors of
alcohol to liability. See Robert M. Howard, Note, The Negligent Commercial TransactionTort:
Imposing Common Law Liability on Merchantsfor Sales andLeases to "Defective" Customers,
1988 DUKE L.J. 755, 767 & n.78. In ten other states and the District of Columbia, commercial
hosts were subject to negligence liability as a matter of common law. See id. at 768 & n.79.
Some courts have held social hosts subject to liability. See, e.g., McGuiggan v. New England
Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1986). However, most jurisdictions have rejected
social host liability. See, e.g., Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Fla. 1987);
Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. 1985) (en banc); Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469
So. 2d 526, 529 (Miss. 1985); Andres v. Alpha Kappa Lambda Fraternity, 730 S.W.2d 547, 553
(Mo. 1987) (en banc).
4. See, e.g., Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1986) (en bane);
Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
5. Professor George Fletcher argued that tort law should primarily concern correctivejustice
and fairness rather than the economic consequences of a rule; corrective justice considers
"whether the victim is entitled to recover and whether the defendant ought to pay." George P.
Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 540 (1972).
Others argue that tort law should focus on economic consequences. Some advocate
enterprise liability, arguing that through imposing liability on enterprises, tort law would spread
the risk of injury to enterprises and through them to their customers. See, e.g., Howard C.
Klemme, The EnterpriseLiability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 153 (1976). Others
advocate that courts impose liability on the cheapest cost avoider, thereby creating an incentive
for the lowest accident costs. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
§§ 1.2, 6.1 (4th ed. 1992).
Until recently, there had been little discussion among academics about the moral basis of
tort law. Articles by philosophy professors Ernest Weinrib and Jules Coleman have sparked a
new analysis of the underlying basis of tort law, in part because of their argument that Aristotle's
concept of corrective justice is at the root of tort law. Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and
Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (1982); Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts:
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es that would flow from liability. 6
. Alcohol creates great costs to society. One study found the social costs
of alcohol in 1985, including the costs borne by drinkers, to be $70 billion.7
Another study found the costs in 1986 to those other than heavy drinkers to
be $25.15 billion.' The costs that alcohol imposes on those that do not
overconsume is the special concern of this article.
Under the concept of corrective justice, when a defendant receives a
wrongful gain and a plaintiff suffers a wrongful loss as the result of defendant's activity, the parties should be returned to their original position,9 and
the defendant should pay for the plaintiffs loss. Obviously, innocent
bystanders who are injured in alcohol-related accidents suffer wrongful loss,
but do alcohol manufacturers receive any wrongful gain? Profits from sales
to those who consume moderate amounts may be legitimate gain. However,
profits from sales to those who overconsume may be wrongful gain, not
because of the fault of the manufacturer, but because of the misuse of alcohol
by those who overconsume. This misuse of alcohol causes manufacturer gains
and bystander losses, and therefore corrective justice may dictate bystander
recovery from manufacturers.
Alcohol is an hedonic product, a product used primarily for consumer
pleasure. Pleasure is important to our society, but it is not as important as
other things. Enjoyment of products should not be at the expensb of persons
who are placed at risk, unless there is a provision for injured bystanders.
Perhaps the price of alcohol and other hedonic products should include the
risks that those products create to others.' 0 Alcohol is especially dangerous
because it limits the ability of users to exercise reasonable care. It is addictive
and may increase the likelihood that consumers will be indigent. These added

Their Scope and Limits (pts. 1 & 2), 1 LAW & PHIL. 371 (1982), 2 LAW & PHIL. 5 (1983);
Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 MCGILL L.J. 403 (1989); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1989). See also Richard A.
Wright, Substantive CorrectiveJustice, 77 IOWA L. REv. 625 (1992); and David G. Owen, The
Moral Foundationsof ProductsLiabilityLaw: TowardFirstPrinciples,68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
427 (1993). For a discussion of the implications of corrective justice for alcohol manufacturer
liability, see infra part II.A.
6. For a discussion of such consequences, see infra part III. PAUL A. LEBEL, JOHN
BARLEYCORN MUST PAY (1992), advocates, on consequentialistic grounds, a statute that would
impose alcohol manufacturer liability for bystander loss.
7. See DOROTHY P. RICE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE
AND MENTAL ILLNESS: 1985 2 tbl. 1 (1990).
8. Philip Cook, The Social Costs of Drinking, in NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND
SOCIAL AFFAIRS, EXPERT MEETING ON THE NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ALCOHOL
USE 49, 55 (1990) [hereinafter NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES] (calculating the costs from

information in Willard G. Manning, supra note 2, at 1607-08).
9. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
10. See infra part II.B.
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characteristics provide even greater justification for imposing liability on
manufacturers of alcohol rather than on manufacturers of other dangerous
hedonic products."
Historically products liability law has neglected bystanders, but perhaps
bystanders deserve greater protection than consumers.' 2 Generally, it is
harder for bystanders than for consumers to take steps for their own safety.
Also, bystanders usually do not choose to expose themselves to the risk
created by the products that cause their injuries.
The consequence of courts imposing liability on manufacturers of alcohol
and other dangerous hedonic products would be that manufacturers would pass
some liability costs to consumers. It is appropriate, however, that consumers
of dangerous hedonic products bear some of the costs that these products
create to bystanders. As anti-drug campaigns have emphasized, drug users
create the market for drugs and are responsible for the consequences resulting
from drug use.'" Manufacturers and consumers of alcohol subject bystanders
to unreciprocated risks.' 4 These risks should be spread to those who benefit
from the product, in the form of higher alcohol prices."' Those who enjoy
dangerous hedonic products should pay for the risks that those products create
to others.
If bystanders do not recover for their injuries, these losses are external
costs not reflected in the decisions of consumers to purchase such products.
Such externalities cause economic inefficiency. The cost of bystander injuries
should be internalized in the cost of products so that the price will reflect all
of the costs that the products create. "
Traditionally, in cases in which an intoxicated person caused injury, those
who sold the alcohol were not liable because of the intervening culpability of
the drinker. 7 In recent years, courts have rejected this rule in many cases
involving negligent servers of alcohol.'" Courts have recognized that persons
other than the drinker may be responsible for the loss. If courts hold
manufacturers liable for alcohol-related injuries to bystanders, maybe

11. See infra part II.C.
12. See infra part II.D.
13. One television commercial showed a police badge that was hit by several bullets and the
blame was placed on drug users.
14. See infra part II.E.
15. See infra part III.A.
16. See infra part III.B.2. Liability would cause an increase in price, a decrease in
consumption, and an increase in safety. See infra text accompanying note 101.
17. See, e.g., Collier v. Stamatis, 162 P.2d 125, 127-28 (Ariz. 1945), overruledby Ontiveros
v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200 (Ariz. 1983) (en bane), supersededby statute, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-312 (1989); Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 621, 623 (Va. 1986).
18. See, e.g., Rong Yau Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc., 534 A.2d 1268, 1277 (D.C.
1987); Lopez v. Maez, 651 P.2d 1269, 1275-76 (N.M. 1982).
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manufacturers should be entitled to an indemnity cause of action against the
drinker. 19 However, the drinker's culpability should not relieve manufacturers of liability.
Injured bystanders might attempt to recover from manufacturers of alcohol
or other dangerous hedonic products under abnormally dangerous activity, 20
failure to warn, 21 negligent design,' and strict products liability misdesign causes of action. But each of these causes of action presents the
bystander with significant difficulties.
This Article will propose a cause of action under which bystanders would
not have to prove that the product causing injury was defective, but would
instead have to meet three requirements that courts have not generally imposed
in strict products liability. Plaintiffs would have to show the following:
1) the product is dangerous;
2) the product is an hedonic product, that is, that it is primarily used for
purposes of entertainment and enjoyment; and
3) the24plaintiff was a bystander, i.e., one whom the product did not benefit.
Each of these factors presents some justification for imposing strict liability.
However, when all of these factors are present, the justification for manufacturer liability is very strong.
Part II of this Article will discuss fairness as a justification for imposing
liability on manufacturers of alcohol and other dangerous hedonic products for
bystander injury. Part III will discuss the consequences that might flow from
such liability. Part IV will consider potential theories under which courts
might establish such liability.

19. See infra text accompanying notes 77-80.
20. See infra part IV.A.
21. See infra part IV.B.
22. See infra part IV.C.
23. See infra part IV.D.
24. See infra part IV.E. James Henderson and Aaron Twerski argue that the American
products liability frontier is closed and that it is unlikely that there will be any further dramatic
expansion of products liability law. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing

the American ProductsLiability Frontier:The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U.
L. R V. 1263 (1991). Although I generally agree with them, the area of bystander liability may
be a major exception.
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II. FAIRNESS, "GOOD WHISKEY," AND BYSTANDERS

A. Corrective Justice, Alcohol Manufacturers and Wrongful Gain
At the root of tort liability is the concept, developed by Aristotle, of
corrective justice.' In recent years, there has been a renaissance of interest
in corrective justice among legal commentators and philosophers.2 6
According to Aristotle, there are two types of justice. Under distributive
justice, a society distributes its goods based on its concept of desert.27
"Corrective justice operates when a disturbance 'violates the proportion'
established by distributive justice." 28 Corrective justice acts when someone
receives a wrongful gain at the expense of another; it restores the parties to the
position they had prior to defendant's gain and plaintiff's loss.2 9
When a culpable party causes plaintiff's loss, it is clear that corrective
justice requires defendant to reimburse the plaintiff. It is unclear, however,
whether Aristotle believed that corrective justice requires that the defendant be
at fault.3" Jules Coleman, citing the rule that one may use the property of
argues that
another in an emergency but must provide compensation,
31
corrective justice does not require a wrongful act.
Kathryn Heidt discusses the implications of corrective justice when a
culpable party cannot pay, but an innocent party gains from the activity of the
culpable party. She argues for "second order" liability, for imposing liability
on the "innocent gainer." The gainer is innocent, but because the gain is
obtained as a result of wrongful activity, it is a wrongful gain. Heidt argues
that under principles of corrective justice, the status quo should be restored:
"To the extent that the actual wrongdoer cannot compensate the victims,
corrective justice requires that the innocent gainers be made to give up their

25. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V (David Ross trans. 1980); see also Kathryn
R. Heidt, CorrectiveJusticeFrom Aristotle to Second OrderLiability: Who Should Pay When the
Culpable Cannot?, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347 (1990).
26. See, e.g., Heidt, supra note 25; sources cited supra note 5.
27. ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, at 1130b 11.30-34.
28. Heidt, supra note 25, at 352-53 (quoting ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, at 1131b 11.31-34).
29. ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, at 1132b 11.19-20.
30. Aristotle said that under corrective justice, the judge should return the parties to their
original position "if one is in the wrong and the other has been wronged, [and/or] if one inflicted
injury and the other received it." ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, at 1132a 11.4-6. One translator
translates the key conjunction "and," another as "or," and a third omits a conjunction. See Heidt,
supra note 25, at 363 & nn.78-79 (citing the relevant translations).
Among modem commentators, Posner argues that corrective justice requires that the
defendant have committed a wrongful act. POSNER, supra note 5, § 8.4. Coleman argues that
corrective justice does not require a wrongful act, but merely wrongful gain. Jules L. Coleman,
Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to Compensate, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 451,463-64 (1987).
31. Coleman, supra note 30, at 463-64.
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gains to compensate the victims." 32 Heidt applies her second order liability
theory to creditors of toxic waste dumpers,33 but it may be that her theory
would more readily apply to manufacturers of alcohol.
Most would probably agree that when an innocent bystander is injured by
someone who is intoxicated, the party who is intoxicated is the most culpable
party. If the bystander looks to the manufacturer for recovery, the question
under principles of corrective justice and second-order liability is whether a
portion of the manufacturer's gain is wrongful.
As a later section of this article will demonstrate, the benefits of alcohol
to our society come through the moderate consumption of alcohol, and the
costs come through overconsumption." The profit that manufacturers receive
from the moderate consumption of alcohol might be appropriately characterized as legitimate gain; but the profit that they receive from overconsumption
of alcohol might properly be considered wrongful gain. Of course, it is
probably impossible to stop the wrongful gain without also stopping the
legitimate gain. But when those who overconsume alcohol cannot compensate
the bystanders that they injure, it may be that profits that manufacturers obtain
as a result of overconsumption should be available to those that are injured.
Drinkers' overconsumption of alcohol causes both losses to injured bystanders
and profit to alcohol manufacturers. When drinkers cannot compensate
bystanders, the manufacturers' gains have been at bystanders' expense.35
Perhaps these profits resulting from overconsumption should be available to
those that are injured.
Under corrective justice, the goal is to restore the status quo, to return the
parties to the position that they were in before the wrongful loss and the
wrongful gain. Bystanders should be returned to the position that they were

32. Heidt, supra note 25, at 360 (footnote omitted).
33. Heidt argues that the gain that creditors of toxic waste dumpers make, over and above
what they could have obtained had the debtor not engaged in toxic dumping, is wrongful gain that
should be available for the cleanup of toxic waste. Id. at 376. It is not clear, however, that toxic
waste dumpers pay greater interest on debts than other debtors.
Heidt suggests that courts should impose liability only in cases of "extraordinary harm."
Id. at 359. "An extraordinary harm is one that, although rare, can alter substantially the existing
proportionality or social fabric." Id. She argues that toxic waste creates an extraordinary harm
because it "can cause severe physical injury and death and further that a site polluted with toxic
waste can continue to cause serious illness and injury for decades or even centuries." Id.
Alcohol, likewise, causes extraordinary harm, a substantial number of deaths and serious injuries.
See iufra part IV.C.l.a.
34. See infra parts IV.C.1-2 (comparing the costs and benefits of alcohol while discussing
whether it is negligent to produce alcohol).
35. Compare Heidt's argument concerning the creditors of toxic waste dumpers: "The
dumper's wrongful activity resulted in both the losses to the victims and the gains to the creditors.
If the actual wrongdoer, the dumper, cannot compensate the victims, the creditors' gains have,
in effect, been at the victims' expense." Heidt, supra note 25, at 361 (footnote omitted).
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drinker is unable to pay, at least so long as6 that payment will not exceed
manufacturers' gain from overconsumption1
As to alcohol-related accidents, it appears that the losses of bystanders are
less than the gain of manufacturers from overconsumption. A later section
estimates that manufacturer liability for bystander loss in 1985 would have
resulted in manufacturer payment of $2.5 billion in damages.3 7 In that same
year, manufacturer profits from the overconsumption of alcohol in the United
States were approximately $2.6 billion.3" It appears that as a matter of
corrective justice, manufacturers of alcohol should pay for bystander injury.
Of course, if courts impose liability on manufacturers, manufacturers will
pass some of the liability costs to consumers in higher prices. However, it
may be appropriate that consumers pay a bit more for the dangerous products
that they consume. Consumers should not benefit from products at the
expense of injured bystanders. 9
In the early days of strict products liability, several courts justified
imposing liability on manufacturers for consumer injury with an argument that
rang of corrective justice: manufacturers benefit from the sale of products.40
This argument had a hollow ring in cases brought by consumers because
consumers, as well as manufacturers, benefit from the products that they
purchase. However, the courts' reasoning does apply to injured bystanders,
who did not benefit from the products that caused their injury. Manufacturers,
purchasers, and consumers should bear some responsibility for bystander
injuries because they have enjoyed the benefits of the product and, thereby,
have placed the bystander at risk.

36. The more difficult situation would be when the losses outweigh the "wrongful gains" of
the "innocent gainers." Heidt proposes that in the case of the creditors of toxic waste dumpers
that their wrongful gain serve as a cap on the damages for which they are liable. Id. at 376.
Heidt proposes that the state use these funds for clean-up, rather than tort damages. Id. Heidt
also discusses the question of how corrective justice might apply when the gain does not equal
the loss. Id. at 351-53 & n.25.
37. For a calculation of the estimated damages, see infra note 101.
38. Manufacturers' profits were calculated as follows: Ten percent of those that drink consume
half of the alcohol. LEBEL, supra note 6, at 221 (citing NATIONAL INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE
& ALCOHOLISM, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON ALCOHOLISM AND
HEALTH (1987)). Half of alcohol manufacturers' gain, therefore, comes from the overconsumption of alcohol. The total sales of alcohol in the United States in 1985 were $56,248 million and
the median net profit margin within the alcohol industry is 9.4%. Edward Giltenan, 41stAnnual
Report on American Industry: Beverages and Tobacco, FORBES, Jan. 9, 1989, at 100. For that
year, gross profits ($56,248 million) X net profit margin (9.4%) X percentage of alcohol
overconsumed (50%) = $2.643 billion.
39. The argument that consumers as a whole bear some responsibility for the injuries caused
by the products that they purchase is developed infra part II.E.
40. See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Ill. 1965), impliedly
overruledby Frazer v. A.F. Munsterman, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 1248 (I1. 1988).
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B. The Limited Value of Alcohol and Other Hedonic Products:

The Inverse of Comment K
Another justification for imposing liability on manufacturers of alcohol is
based on the relative importance of alcohol to our society. It may be that the
price of products that are created mainly for the pleasure of consumers should
include the costs that such products impose on others. Pleasure is important,
but not as important as many other values.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the limited value of hedonic
products in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp. :41 "The evaluation of the utility of a
product also involves the relative need for that product; some products are
essentials, while others are luxuries. A product that fills a critical need and
can be designed in only one way should be viewed differently from a luxury
item. 142
The suggestion by the O'Brien court that luxury or recreational products
might be of less value than other products has been criticized by some
commentators as being contrary to economists' practice of measuring the value
of products by what consumers are willing to pay for them.43 Many people
pay a lot of money for hedonic products. However, recognizing that certain
broad categories of products, such as hedonic products, have less value than
necessities is quite consistent with valuing things based on what consumers
would pay. The fact that persons may spend more on entertainment than on
food does not mean that they value entertainment more than food. Given a
choice between either food or entertainment, people would be willing to pay

41. 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983), overruled by statute as stated in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990).
42. O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 306. In O'Brien the plaintiff was injured when he dove into an
above-ground swimming pool. Id. at 301. The court suggested that on remand the plaintiff, in
an attempt to show that the risks of above-ground swimming pools outweigh their utility, "might
seek to establish that pools are marketed primarily for recreational, not therapeutic purposes."
Id. at 306.
However, the plaintiff in O'Brien was not in as strong a position as is the innocent
bystander in the alcohol cases. He was a consumer, the risks of the above-ground swimming
pool were obvious, and the product had a warning. See id. at 302. O'Brien is discussed infra
at text accompanying notes 284 to 287.
43. An American Law Institute Reporters' Study, in its criticism of a broad risk-utility rule,
states as follows:
An open-ended risk-utility test, however, permits juries in adjudicating the legality
of designs to presume that necessities provide more social utility than luxuries. In
fact, the value of a particular product design is typically measured by the consumers'
willingness to pay for the product so designed; so when consumers are adequately
informed about risks, tort law should rely on markets to decide what product designs
should be produced.
2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL

INJURY 48 (1991) [hereinafter ALI STUDY]. The ALI Study recognizes that economists measure
value based on what people are willing to pay. It then appears to assume, incorrectly, that what
they are willing to pay is the same as what they actually pay. See id. at 48-49.
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a lot more for food. When faced with starvation, Esau traded his birthright

for a bowl of stew." A modem Esau might trade his swimming pool for a
cheeseburger.
People spend their money on the things that are most important to them,
but money is subject to diminishing marginal returns. With each additional
increment of money, they purchase things that are less important to them.
Psychologists have pointed out the rather obvious fact that people have a
hierarchy of needs.45 They strive to meet some needs before they pursue
others. Within this hierarchy, pleasure comes after the needs for air, water,
food, shelter, and safety. 6
Within our society, hedonic activities are important, but they are not as
important as other activities. The recent trend toward awarding hedonic
damages in personal injury cases illustrates the importance we place on

44.
Once when Jacob was cooking some stew, Esau came in from the open country,
famished. He said to Jacob, "Quick, let me have some of that red stew! I'm famished!"
Jacob replied, "First sell me your birthright."
"Look, I am about to die," Esau said. "What good is the birthright to me?"
But Jacob said, "Swear to me first." So he swore an oath to him, selling his birthright
to Jacob.
Then Jacob gave Esau some bread and some lentil stew. He ate and drank, and then
got up and left.
So Esau despised his birthright.
Genesis 25:29-34.
45. See, e.g., ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 97 (2d ed. 1970).
46. The hierarchy of human needs has been described as follows:
The Hierarchy of Human Needs Model, developed by Abraham Maslow [supra note
45], classifies needs, the internal drives for satisfaction that give rise to human
behavior.
According to Maslow, when a person behaves in such a way that one need is
satisfied, then other needs begin to manifest themselves. There are always needs
demanding satisfaction. Certain needs, however, take priority over others. A highpriority need will dominate behavior until it is satisfied, at least partially. Then it will
give way to other needs with lower priorities.
Human needs are classified by the model into the following five categories,
according to their priorities for satisfaction.
Basic (survival)needs: air, water, food, shelter;
Safety needs: to know that one's survival is not in jeopardy;
Belongingness (social) needs: to be accepted by others; to be a part of one's
social environment;
Ego-Status needs: to feel significant, effectual, and competent; to have selfesteem;
Self-Actualizationneeds: to grow and expand one's personal horizons; to become
all that one can become; to challenge oneself.
WALTON C. BOSHEAR & KARL G. ALBRECHT, UNDERSTANDING PEOPLE: MODELS AND
CONCEPTS 24 (1977). To the extent that alcohol helps to facilitate social interaction, it may help
to meet what psychologists classify as a social need, though one which they classify as secondary
to the needs for food, shelter, and safety; to the extent that alcohol merely provides pleasure, they
might say that it does not meet a need.
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pleasure.47 However, the fact that hedonic damages have been added at such
a late date to the traditional damages, such as pain and suffering, medical
expenses, lost wages and property damages illustrates that pleasure is less
important than many other social goods.
The argument here is not that the risks of hedonic products outweigh their
benefits. 4 Dangerous hedonic products play an important role in our
society. 49 People hunt with guns and drive pleasure boats and all-terrain
vehicles. Life would not be very much fun or very interesting if we never did
anything that carried with it a risk of death or serious injury. The argument
here is that those that use hedonic products which cause risk to innocent
bystanders, no matter how great the products' entertainment value, should bear
the risk of that loss through higher prices.
Precedent exists in products liability law for varying the strictness of the
products liability rule based on the importance of the product to society.
Comment k of section 402A of the Restatement distinguishes between products
that "may be necessary to alleviate pain and suffering or to sustain life" and
those products that are "used to make work easier or to provide pleasure.""0
The Restatement relieves manufacturers of health and safety products of many
of the risks of liability because those products are so important. A rule that
imposed stricter liability on manufacturers of hedonic products than that
imposed on products generally would be the inverse of comment k. A later
section of this Article argues that comment k may serve as precedent for such
a rule.51
C. The Special Dangers of Alcohol: It Impairs Consumers' Ability to Drive
Safely, Impairs Their Ability to "Know When to Say When, " and Increases
the Likelihood That They Will Be Unable to Compensate Victims
In addition to being a hedonic product, alcohol creates a high likelihood
that its consumers will become intoxicated and cause injury. 2 Alcohol

47. See, e.g., Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 172, 183 (Conn. 1976) (stating that "just
damages" include compensation for the destruction of decedent's ability to enjoy life's activities).
48. A later section considers that argument. See infra parts IV.C.1-2.
49. As one court stated, "Sports are absolutely essential to the public welfare." New Jersey
Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 580, 600 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971),
aff'd as modified, 292 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 989 (1973).
50. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 475-77 (Cal. 1988) (stating that RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. k, makes this distinction through its exemption of prescription
drugs from strict products liability).
51. See infra part IV' E.5.
52. See infra part P'.C..a (discussing the costs of the risks created by alcohol use). A
parallel exists between alcohol manufacturer cases and negligent entrustment cases. For example,
the manufacturer of alcohol could be compared to the manufacturer of a slingshot. In a Michigan
Supreme Court case, Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1977), the court held that

marketing a dangerous product, a slingshot, without attempting to limit its availability to
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4
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impairs the ability of consumers to limit consumption both in the short term
and in the long term. In the short term, for a few hours after consumption,
alcohol limits judgment.5 3 Consumers may initially intend to consume only
a few drinks, but after a few drinks they are likely to believe that they can
consume a few more. They are subject to diminishing marginal reasoning.

ability, which impairs their ability to "know when to say when." In the long
run, heavy alcohol use damages the ability of consumers to think clearly, even

when not consuming alcohol. Alcohol is addicting; addicts require higher and

higher doses to feed their addiction,54 which creates additional risks of drunk
driving and bystander injuries. Of course, these risks are foreseeable to the

manufacturer.
Additionally, it is likely that the drinker will be uninsured or underinsured
and unable to pay an injured bystander. Alcoholics, in particular, are likely
to spend their money on alcohol rather than save it, and they are also likely
to be unemployed. They are likely to be uninsured or underinsured, both
because they usually spend what money they have on alcohol and because they
may have been involved in prior collisions, which makes obtaining insurance
difficult. Because alcoholics are likely to be without funds to pay for
bystander injuries, alcohol manufacturers bear a special responsibility for these'
costs.

D. The Bystander's Limited Opportunity to Take Safety Steps
Historically, products liability law treated bystanders rather badly. The
common law denied bystanders a recovery, even when they could show
manufacturer negligence. 5 Courts reversed this rule early in the twentieth
century and allowed bystanders to recover for manufacturer negligence.' 6

purchasers likely to misuse it, in this case children, could be negligent. Id. at 769-70. Similarly,
manufacturers of alcohol may be unreasonable in manufacturing a product that they know may
be bought by those who are likely to misuse it.
53. See infra text accompanying note 185.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 188-91.
55. The early common law denied recovery to bystanders who were injured by the negligence
of product manufacturers; recovery was limited to those who were in privity with the
manufacturer. For example, in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), a mail
coach driver was injured as a result of the defendant contractor's failure to keep the coach in
good repair in accordance with the defendant's contract with the Postmaster General. Id. at 403.
Finding for the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff was not in privity with the defendant,
the court stated: "Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who
entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit,
would ensue." Id. at 405.
56. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.)
(rejecting the privity limitation in negligence cases). In MacPhersonthe plaintiff was injured in
a defective automobilehe purchased from a dealer. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer who sold
the automobile to the dealer. Id. at 1051. Finding that the lack of contractual privity between
the plaintiff and the manufacturer did not bar the plaintiff's recovery, Justice Cardozo stated:
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Strict products liability has followed the same pattern, initially denying
bystander recovery, 7 and then placing bystanders on an equal footing with
consumers."
However, it may be that bystanders should receive greater
protection than purchasers and consumers. 59

Fairness may justify providing greater protection to bystanders than to
consumers of a product because bystanders have only limited opportunity to
take steps for their own safety. Bystanders are likely to undervalue or be
unaware of the risk that products create to them. 6' In Elmore v. American

We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else.
We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its
source in the law.
Id. at 1053. Other jurisdictions followed quickly, allowing injured bystanders to recover against
negligent manufacturers. The MacPhersondecision "found immediate acceptance, and at the end
of some forty years is universal lav in the United States." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 683 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted).

57. For a discussion of cases denying recovery, see Jeffrey Kuta, Note, Strict Products
Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism, 38 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 625
(1971).

Strict products liability developed initially as a warranty cause of action, based on the
theory that a defect in the product violated an implied warranty in the contract of sale between
the manufacturer and the purchaser. Therefore, recovery was limited to purchasers in privity
with the manufacturer. KEETON, supra note 56, § 96, at 681. In Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), the court extended warranty protection to "consumers"
even though they were not parties to the original purchase. Id. at 81. The Uniform Commercial
Code does not take a stand on the issue-of whether bystanders should be allowed recovery under
a warranty. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (1989). Instead, it gives three alternative provisions, which
provide protection to persons ranging from members of the family and guests in the home of the
buyer to "any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods." Id.
Beginning in the early 1960's, courts recognized strict products liability. See, e.g.,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) (en banc). However, the
drafters of the Restatement and some courts continued to be influenced by warranty law in the
development of strict liability. The drafters of the Restatement recognized that courts had not
.gone beyond allowing recovery to users and consumers" and took no position on whether
bystanders should be allowed to recover under strict liability in tort. RESTATEMENT, supra note
1, § 402A cmt. o.
58. See, e.g., Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1277 (8th Cir. 1972)
(predicting Iowa law); Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1970) (applying Vermont law);
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 88-89 (Cal. 1969) (en bane); Haumersen v.
Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d 7, 16 (Iowa 1977); Howes v. Hansen, 201 N.W.2d 825, 831-32
(WVis. 1972).
59. For development of the argument that bystanders should be preferred to consumers
because they do not benefit from the product, see supra text accompanying notes 39-40. For a
more comprehensive discussion of the history of bystanders and products liability law and the
justifications for giving greater protection to bystanders, see Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Dangerous
Productsand InjuredBystanders, 81 KY. L.J. 687, 690-92 (1993).

60. See Kuta, supra note 57, at 638; Note, Strict ProductsLiability and the Bystander, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 916, 935 (1964).
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Motors Corp.,6 one of the early cases to extend strict products liability
protection to bystanders, the California Supreme Court stated:
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the
consumer or user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably
foreseeable. Consumers and users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect
for defects and to limit their purchases to articles manufactured by
reputable manufacturers and sold by reputable retailers, where as the
bystander ordinarily has no such opportunities. In short, the bystander is
in greater need of protection from defective products which are dangerous,
and if any distinction should be made between bystanders and users, it
should be made, contrary to the position of defendants, to extend greater
62
liability in favor of the bystanders.
In the case of the dangers of alcohol, bystanders have only limited opportunities to take steps for their own safety. They can stay at home or they can
travel in tanks.
People should be able to protect themselves through
reasonable safety measures or to recover for their injuries.
E. UnreciprocatedRisk
Another justification for bystander recovery is present when bystanders
are injured by dangerous products that are not used by everyone. Manufacturers and consumers of products that everyone does not use expose others to
unreciprocated risk. Professor George Fletcher argued that "a victim has a
right to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and different in
order from those created by the victim and imposed on the defendant - in
short, for injuries resulting from nonreciprocal risks."63 Fletcher would not
impose liability for "the background risks that must be borne as part of group
living."' The case for imposing liability when a defendant merely exposes
a plaintiff to a risk that is similar to the risk to which the plaintiff exposes the
defendant is not compelling.
Of course, under products liability, when courts impose liability on
manufacturers, consumers bear much of the cost through higher prices.
Similarly, if courts impose on manufacturers the costs of bystander injury from
alcohol-related accidents, manufacturers will pass most of these costs to
consumers through higher prices. While some might argue that it is unfair to
impose on responsible drinkers the costs created by irresponsible drinkers, it
is appropriate that responsible consumers share the cost of the bystander's

61. 451 P.2d 84.
62. Id. at 89. The plaintiff was injured when she was struck by a vehicle with a defective
drive train. Id. at 87.

63. Fletcher, supra note 5, at 542.
64. Id. at 543.
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injury. Even responsible drinkers help to create the danger by helping to
create a market for alcoholic beverages. As some anti-drug use advertisements
illustrate,' both a product's supply and demand result in damage from that
product. The risk to innocent bystanders is created, to some extent, by all
those who use the product.'
Fletcher discusses the rationale for cost shifting in cases of bystander
injury from defective automobiles:
In these cases, the ultimate issue is whether the motoring public as a whole
should pay a higher price for automobiles in order to compensate
manufacturers for their liability costs to pedestrians. The rationale for
putting the costs on the motoring public is that motoring, as a 67whole,
imposes a nonreciprocal risk on pedestrians and other bystanders.
In cases in which bystanders are injured due to overconsumption of alcohol,
the issue is whether the drinking public imposes on bystanders a nonreciprocal
risk.68

65. One such television advertisement showed a police officers badge, repeatedly shot with
bullet holes, as the announcer stated that drug use is not a victimless crime.
66. It could be argued that the consumer responsibility argument applies to the consumers of
all products that cause risk to innocent bystanders. For example, should all automobile users be
responsible, through higher prices, for all injuries to innocent bystanders? Two related factors
distinguish automobiles and dangerous hedonic products such as alcohol. First, alcohol, unlike
automobiles, is manufactured primarily for recreational use. Second, the products can be
distinguished on a theory of unreciprocated risk; nearly everyone experiences both the benefits
and dangers of automobile use. However, alcohol users enjoy the product's benefit while
exposing nonusers to an unreciprocated risk.
67. Fletcher, supra note 5,at 570, quoted in Patricia Marschall,An Obvious Wrong Does Not
Make a Right: Manufacturers'Liabilityfor Patently DangerousProducts, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1065, 1075 (1973). Marschall suggests that Fletcher's theory justifies imposing strict liability on
manufacturers for consumer injury because the manufacturer is exposing the consumer to a risk
and the consumer is merely using a product. Id. at 1074. However, Marschall is unable to
reconcile her suggestion that Fletcher's theory supports strict products liability with the Fletcher's
statement quoted in the text accompanying this note. Fletcher's statement does not assume that
manufacturers of automobiles are exposing all plaintiffs, including consumers, to unreciprocated
risk. Marschall incorrectly suggests that "[i]n this passage, Fletcher seems to fall back into the
reasonableness paradigm without noticing what he has done." Id. at 1075. The consumer, as well
as the manufacturer, has exposed the consumer to risk.
As the quote in the text illustrates, Fletcher's concept of unreciprocal risk is consistent with
a risk spreading theory. When a group of consumers create an unreciprocated risk to another
group, the courts should impose liability and spread the risk to the consumers. See infra part
III.A.
68. Quite clearly, those who drink and drive expose those who do not to unreciprocated risk.
Our current negligence system imposes liability on drunk drivers for bystander injury. In those
cases in which the driver has sufficient liability insurance coverage or sufficient assets to
compensate the plaintiff, the current system appropriately pays for the bystander's injuries based
on the driver's negligence. The question raised in this article, however, is who should pay for
those losses that the drunk driver and the drunk driver's insurance do not cover.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4
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Bystanders who do not use or benefit from a product are exposed to
nonreciprocal risk.69 The strongest case based on nonreciprocal risk for
imposing liability on alcohol manufacturers is one in which the bystander does
not drink. Two-thirds of the population that drink impose a nonreciprocal risk
on the one-third that does not.7" The nondrinker bystander has not helped
create the risk that causes the injury and has not exposed others to such a risk.
But, of course, drinkers and bystanders are not mutually exclusive groups.
The unreciprocated risk argument loses some of its force when it is applied to
bystanders who sometimes drink. Bystanders who drink help to create the
same risk that injured them. Nevertheless, Fletcher obviously did not believe
that the plaintiff's use of the product should preclude liability - almost all
pedestrians in the example that he cites benefit from motor vehicles.
Even though the bystander's prior use of alcohol undercuts the unreciprocated risk argument, recovery by such bystanders is probably justified. The
one tenth of Americans who are heavy drinkers are the most likely to endanger
others and appropriately would bear a greater percentage of the cost. 7'
Bystanders who drink would contribute to funds for paying bystander liability
costs. The degree of contribution would be directly proportional to the
amount of purchases made.72
F. The Responsibility of the Intervening Actor
The most culpable party in an alcohol-related injury is the drinker who
drives while intoxicated and causes the accident. It might be argued that the
intoxicated driver's negligence should cut off the responsibility of others.
Courts have faced a similar issue in cases in which injured bystanders have
alleged that a bar negligently served excessive amounts of alcohol to
drivers.73 The older cases found the intoxicated driver to be a superseding
cause of the loss, cutting off the bar's liability.'
In recent years, courts have recognized that drinkers may not be the only
persons that are responsible for their intoxicated condition. Courts have

69. The weakness of the nonreciprocated risk argument in cases of motor vehicle manufacturers is that almost all benefit from motor vehicles - even those who do not ride in motor vehicles
generally use goods that are transported in them.
70. Even those drinkers that do not drink and drive help to create the risk by creating the
demand for the dangerous product.
71. See supra note 38.
72. As a practical matter, it would be difficult to apply a rule that only imposed liability when
the bystander was not a consumer. It would be difficult to determine how to treat the bystander
who consumes alcohol only a few times a year or only during communion services.
73. See sources cited supra note 3.
74. See Howard, supra note 3, at 767 & n.75. Courts generally find that a foreseeable
interveningcause does not cut off the plaintiff's liability. See, e.g., KEETON, supranote 56, § 44,
at 303. However, courts had denied recovery despite the intoxicated driver being a dependent
and quite foreseeable intervening cause.
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increasingly imposed liability on bars and social hosts on the basis that it is
negligent to serve excessive amounts of alcohol to those persons who will

foreseeably cause injury.75 These cases provide official recognition of the
foreseeability that drinkers will overconsume alcohol and cause injury.
The failure of servers to monitor the consumption of alcohol may lead to
injury, but the production of alcohol leads to injury as well. Whether the

manufacture of alcohol provides a sufficient basis for liability is a different
question, which Part IV of this Article will discuss. But the present point is
merely that, as in the server liability cases, the culpability of the intervening
drinker should not cut off the responsibility of the manufacturer.76
If courts impose liability on the manufacturer, it might be that the
manufacturer should have an indemnity cause of action against the drinker.
Under an indemnity cause of action, a party who pays a judgment is
reimbursed in full from another party. Courts allow indemnity in some cases
in which the responsibility of one party is substantially greater than that of the
party seeking indemnity.' An alternative would be to provide the manufacturer with a contribution cause of action against the drinker, which would
provide a partial reimbursement.7
Allowing the manufacturer to bring an indemnity or contribution action
against the drinker would be fair because the drinker should not be relieved
of responsibility. It may be that the culpability of the drinker is so much
greater than that of the manufacturer that the manufacturer should be entitled
to indemnity. The cheapest cost avoider argument, discussed in the next
section,79 also supports a right of indemnity for the manufacturer; where

possible, the entire loss should be placed on the drinker to place maximum
pressure on the drinker to exercise care.

0

75. See sources cited supra note 3.
76. The cause of action suggested herein is similar in some respects to liability for handgun
injury imposed by the Maryland Court of Appeals on manufacturers of "Saturday Night Specials"
for injuries occurring to innocent victims who suffer gunshot wounds from the criminal use of
the hand guns. See Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985). For a discussion
of Kelley, see infra text accompanying notes 273 to 278.
77. See KEETON, supra note 56, § 51, at 343-44.
78. Id. § 51, at 344. In some jurisdictions, contribution is pro rata; in others, contribution
is allowed on a comparative fault basis. See id.
79. See infra part III.B.1.
80. A trend exists toward replacing indemnity and pro-rata contribution with comparative
contribution. See KEETON, supra note 56, § 51, at 344. Comparative contribution has the
disadvantage of requiring an additional calculation by the jury and creating an additional subject
of negotiation for attorneys, but it probably provides the greatest degree of fairness to the parties.
The jury, under comparative contribution, imposes responsibility based on the community's
general sense of fairness.
Of course, there is a great risk that the right of either contribution or indemnity will be of
no benefit to the manufacturer. There is a high likelihood that the drinker will be uninsured and
unable to either pay the plaintiff or reimburse the manufacturer. If courts do not impose liability
on the manufacturers, of course, this risk that the consumer will be uninsured or unable to pay
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III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF LIABILITY

When considering a tort rule, courts are influenced not only by fairness,
but also by the consequences that the rule might create. This section will
explore the effect that imposing liability on manufacturers of alcohol and other
dangerous hedonic products for bystander injury might have on prices,
safety, 8' and efficiency.
A. Spreading the Risk of Bystander Injury:
Court-Imposed Third Party Insurance
If courts impose liability on a manufacturer for bystander injury, the
bystander receives compensation and the manufacturer can spread the risk of
the loss by raising consumer prices. Justice Traynor of the California
Supreme Court presented the risk spreading argument for strict products
liability as follows: "The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for
the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among
the public as a cost of doing business."'
The risk-spreading argument recognizes that strict products liability is
analogous to an insurance system. If courts impose liability, manufacturers
will raise prices. The additional charge acts as an insurance pre-ium. The
"premiums" that are collected pay for the losses of injured persc..s. Those
who favor risk spreading argue that it is better for many consumers to bear a

small loss, than for the injured to bear a devastating loss.83
will be borne by the bystander. It is appropriate that courts hold manufacturers responsible for
the risk that the drinker will be indigent and uninsured or under-insured. It is not only
foreseeable that alcohol will cause an accident in which an innocent bystander will be injured,
but it is likely that the drinker will be indigent, uninsured, or under-insured as a result of alcohol
consumption.
81. One reason often given by courts for imposing liability on the manufacturers of products
is that to do so will encourage the production of safer products. See cases cited id. § 98, at 693
n.4.
82. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (en banc) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
83. Guido Calabresi offered the following two propositions to justify risk spreading:
(a) that taking a large sum of money from one person is more likely to result in
economic dislocation, and therefore in secondary or avoidable losses, than taking a
series of small sums from many people, and (b) that even if the total economic
dislocation is the same, many small losses are preferable to one large one, simply
because people feel they suffer less if 10,000 of them lost $1 than if one loses
$10,000.
While the first of these propositions is an empirical generalization not too
difficult to accept, the second is in its precise terms a variant of the economist's
theory of the diminishing marginal utility of money.
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499,
517 (1961).
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As noted previously, some courts have imposed liability on bars for
serving alcohol to intoxicated patrons. 4 One of the reasons that the courts
did so was that bars are able to spread the risk of injury through higher
prices.' Alcohol manufacturers, of course, have an even greater ability to
spread the risk of bystander injury because of their bigger customer base.
Manufacturers can spread the risk of loss in the many cases in which the
bystander has neither a financially responsible drinker nor a negligent server
from whom to seek compensation.
The argument that the tort liability system should require consumers to
purchase "insurance" with their products for consumer injury is somewhat
paternalistic; courts should require consumers to purchase "insurance" for
their own benefit. Imposing liability would limit consumer options for the
sake of the consumer. If courts impose liability on manufacturers, customers
must purchase "insurance" by paying higher prices. Some consumers may
prefer to pay lower costs for products and assume the risk of injury or rely on
their own health insurance plans.8 6
In the case of alcohol, however, this claim that spreading the risk of
consumer injury is paternalistic meets with strong arguments. The arguments
are basically the same as arguments currently made for imposing manufacturer
liability for tobacco-related consumer injuries." First, some paternalism is
justified because alcohol and tobacco marketing is directed at young people
(who may need a little paternalism) and both products are addictive. Second,
consumer injury costs resulting from both alcohol and tobacco are borne not
only by consumers but also by society through higher health and life insurance
costs and through .higher welfare costs."8
Whatever the merit of the paternalism argument against spreading the risk
of consumer injuries, it does not apply to spreading the risk of bystander
injuries. To continue with the insurance analogy: When courts impose liability
on manufacturers for consumer injury, they impose on consumers a first party
insurance system, which pays for the consumers' injuries. When courts
impose liability on manufacturers for bystander injury, they impose on
consumers a third party insurance system, which compensates third parties that
consumers injure. It may not be the business of the state to protect people
from themselves, but it is the business of the state to protect people from each

84. See sources cited supra note 3.
85. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 3, at 769 n.84.
86. In addition, some consumers will be unwilling to pay, and the poor may be unable to pay,
higher prices. Manufacturers will withdraw some products from the market. See generallyJames
M. Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 64 (1970) (predicting the
economic consequences of imposing strict liability on product manufacturers).
87. See Richard C. Ausness, Compensationfor Smoking-Related Injuries:An Alternative to
StrictLiabilityin Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1085 (1990); Frank J. Vandall, Reallocatingthe Costs
of Smoking: The Applicationof Absolute Liability to CigaretteManufacturers,52 OHIO ST. L.J.
405 (1991).
88. See Vandall, supra note 87, at 418.
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other. Therefore, it is legitimate for the state to adopt a tort rule requiring
consumers to pay for the injuries that their products cause.
B. Safety and Efficiency
1. The Cheapest Cost Avoider
Guido Calabresi has argued that imposing liability on the party that can
avoid a loss at the cheapest cost yields both the greatest level of safety and the
highest level of efficiency that a liability rule can yield.89 The rational,
profit-maximizing, cheapest cost avoider is most likely to take safety steps if
that party's safety cost is less than its liability cost.' Imposing liability on
the cheapest cost avoider is the most efficient rule because it yields the
smallest sum of accident costs and safety costs. 91
89. The cheapest cost avoider is the most likely to adopt safety steps and is able to adopt them
at the lowest cost, but will adopt them only when the steps are cost-justified. See Guido
Calabresi, ConcerningCause and the Law of Torts: An Essayfor HarryKalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI.
L. REv. 69, 84-85 (1975).
90. See id. We must be careful not to assume that imposing liability on the manufacturer
automatically insures the safest products. That assumption is not necessarily so. Assume the
manufacturer could make a product safer, by using a different design, for $25. The consumer
could make the product safe for $20, or a bystander could make the product safe for $10. If the
bystander's risk of injury has a value of $15 (for example a .01 risk of a $1500 injury), the
bystander would be the only one of the three who would choose to act safely if faced with the
risk of bearing the loss. It might not be fair to impose the loss on a bystander, but that is another
matter.
Assigning responsibility to the cheapest cost avoider also has the advantage of being the
most economically efficient method of loss avoidance. In the above example, if we impose
liability on the consumer, the consumer would not pay $20 to avoid the $15 liability. The
bystander would not pay $10 to avoid the risk of loss because the bystander would rather suffer
the loss ($15), recoup the loss from the consumer, and keep the $10 (rather than pay the $10 to
avoid the loss). If liability is imposed on either the manufacturer or the consumer, there is a net
loss to society of $5 because the liable party would pay $15 in damages to the bystander, who
could have avoided the loss at a $10 cost.
It is true that if liability is imposed on either the manufacturer or the consumer, that party
could pay the bystanders $11 to avoid the loss. If the transaction costs were low enough that it
would be cost-effective for the manufacturer or consumer to find and pay the bystander, they
might do so. However, the transaction cost would be a loss to society. If the transaction costs
were not low enough that it would be cost-effective for the manufacturer or consumer to locate
the bystander, they would not do so, and the parties would not obtain the safe result.
91. See id. In the case of consumer injury, there is a debate as to who is the cheapest cost
avoider. Compare Buchanan, supra note 86 and Roland N. McKean, ProductsLiability: Trends
and Implications, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 3 (1970) (both authors asserting that the consumer
generally is the cheapest cost avoider) with Guido Calabresi & Kenneth C. Bass III, Right
Approach, Wrong Implications:A Critiqueof McKean on ProductsLiability, 38 U. CHI. L. REv.
74 (1970) (asserting that the manufacturer generally is the cheapest cost avoider).
Although Calabresi has suggested that manufacturers are generally the cheapest cost
avoiders, see Calabresi & Bass, supra, he and Hirschoff have also argued that courts must search
for the cheapest cost avoider in each case. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test
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But the theory runs into problems when applied to alcohol-related
accidents. In such accidents, the alcohol consumer is the cheapest cost
avoider. The manufacturer can take some steps to make the product safer, but
the consumer can avoid the risk to bystanders by merely not drinking in
excess. A reasonable consumer will conclude that the risk of liability for
bystander damages from drinking and driving, not to mention the risk of harm
to the consumer, is greater than any benefit. A reasonable consumer will not
drink and drive.
Unfortunately, not all drinkers are the rational, profit-maximizing actors
that economic theory posits. The ability of drinkers to do a cost/benefit
analysis is likely to be diminished by the product. As drinkers drink, their
ability to evaluate their driving ability diminishes. They become increasingly
less likely to "know when to say when." Some drinkers are alcoholics, and
they place a value on overconsumption that a reasonable person would
consider to be "excessive. "' Imposing liability on the drinker alone will not
yield the levels of safety and efficiency suggested by cheapest cost avoider
theory. Courts should keep up any pressure that the risk of liability might
impose on drinkers. They should continue to allow injured bystanders to
recover from intoxicated drivers and give manufacturers an indemnity cause
of action against drinkers; 93 however, courts cannot expect drinker liability
alone to yield sufficient levels of safety.
As between the bystander and the manufacturer, the manufacturer is likely
to be the cheapest cost avoider. Manufacturers could take some steps to avoid
some alcohol-related accidents. Manufacturers might wage more aggressive
campaigns to discourage drinking and driving; they might package their
alcohol in a way that would make it less dangerous; they might sell it to
distributors that would sell it to consumers in a less risky manner. 4 If the
costs of bystander loss were sufficiently great, manufacturers could avoid the
loss by ceasing its manufacture, though imposition of liability will not raise

for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972). However, as Patricia Marschall

has argued, such a search would be "impractical and inefficient" because it would make trials
complex and settlement difficult. Marschall, supra note 67, at 1100-01.
92. In addition, in many cases, alcoholics will not have sufficient assets to compensate an
injured parry. The risk of liability would not affect their behavior even if they could think
rationally.
93. It is appropriate that courts place pressure on the drinker to act reasonably. Some drinkers
may be motivated to act reasonably by the threat of liability for bystander injury, though it would
seem that the threat of injury to themselves and the threat of prosecution alone would create
reasonable behavior. The proposal herein would not relieve the drinker of liability for bystander
injury; as a prior section argued courts should allow manufacturers who pay bystanders under the
proposed theory a right of indemnity against the drinker. See supra text accompanying notes 7780. The manufacturer liability proposed herein will not reduce any effect that the risk of liability
has on the behavior of drinkers.
94. See generally John L. Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Products

Liability Theory, 34 HAsrINGs L.J. 529, 549-50 (1983) (discussing the incentive to create a safer
product that manufacturers will have if costs of accidents are imposed on them).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4
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costs to that level.' Bystanders, on the other hand, generally are not in a
position to take steps to avoid injuries arising from alcohol consumption.
Bystanders are merely engaged in the activity of ordinary life, and they would
have to cease normal activity to avoid risks created by drunk drivers.
2. Internalizing the Cost of Bystander Injury
If courts imposed liability on alcohol manufacturers for bystander injury,
that cost would be internalized in the cost of alcohol, yielding a more efficient
result. Currently, the risk of bystander injury from alcohol consumption is
likely to be a cost that is external to the purchase of alcohol. The price of
alcohol does not reflect the dangers which it creates to bystanders, and the risk
of bystander injury only affects consumers to the extent that they think about
liability or their moral obligation to the bystander.
However, there is a great danger that consumers will not give sufficient
consideration to the risks which the products that they purchase create to
bystanders. Some consumers will overlook the risks that their activity will
cause to others. A consumer who considers the risk of liability is not as likely
as a manufacturer to be affected by the risk because consumers are not as
likely as manufacturers to be able to pay the damages of a seriously injured
victim. 96
The risk that the consumer will be judgment-proof may be
especially great in the case of alcoholics. Consumers of alcohol are especially
likely to fail to consider the risks of liability to injured bystanders because
alcohol may limit their ability to think clearly. 9
If courts impose liability on manufacturers of dangerous hedonic products
for injuries to bystanders, manufacturers will internalize the cost of bystander
injury. They will choose the most efficient combination of safety steps and
price increases to cover bystander loss. 98 To the extent that they can do so,
manufacturers will pass their costs, whether liability or safety costs, on to

consumers.

95. See infra note 101.
96. See Note, Enforcing Waivers in ProductsLiability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1137 (1983).
97. See infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of alcohol on the
body).
98. Judge Adams of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated in a case extending strict
liability for defective products to manufacturers for bystander injury:
Inasmuch as the defective product may well injure persons who have not purchased
the product or in any way dealt with the manufacturer, there is no price mechanism
by which to insure such persons against the risk of loss. . . . The imposition on
manufacturers of strict liability for defective products accomplishes the cost
internalization that the price mechanism cannot achieve by placing the complete cost
of the injuries on the manufacturer.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-ManvilleSales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 1980).
His argument applies to bystander injuries from nondefective products, just as it does to those
from defective products.
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Consumers are making a cost/benefit decision whenever they purchase a
product. If the market is to work efficiently, the costs of the product should
reflect the risks to bystanders, as well as the other costs of the product."

When manufacturers pass these costs to consumers, the price of products more
nearly reflects the costs which the products create to society. Thus, consumers
will be forced, through the higher prices, to take into consideration the losses
that products cause.'0o
This article argues that losses from injuries to bystanders should be
imposed on manufacturers of alcohol, whatever the ultimate consequences on
alcohol's price and consumption. The price of alcohol should include
bystander costs; consumers could then determine whether these costs outweigh
alcohol's benefits. Imposing liability on manufacturers would be likely to have
some beneficial effect on safety. While price increases would not affect some
consumers, they would likely affect younger drinkers, who have less
disposable income. Reduction in consumption by younger drinkers might have
an especially important effect on safety because younger drinkers are much
more likely than older drinkers to be involved in alcohol-related accidents.' 0 1

99. See Klemme, supra note 5, at 158-61 (discussing the theory of enterprise liability
generally).

100. Cf. id.
101. It is difficult to quantify the effect that imposing liability on manufacturers of alcohol for
bystander injury would have on the price, the consumption of alcohol, and safety. The Rice
study calculated the costs created by alcohol during the year 1985, so we will attempt to evaluate
that year. RICE, supra note 7.
An initial difficulty is estimating the damages that courts would impose on manufacturers
if they were subject to liability for bystander injury. The Department of Transportation estimates
that in 1985, 7400 people who were not drinking were killed in alcohol-related automobile
collisions. DRUNK DRIVING FAcTs, supra note 2, cited in Manning, supra note 2, at 1608.
According to industry observers, the yearly average wrongful death judgment against alcohol
providers in dram shop cases is $500,000. INS. INFO. INST., DrunkDriving andLiquorLiability,
DATA BASE REPORTS, May 1991, at 5. This fact suggests that recovery for bystander deaths in
one year would be $3.7 billion.
A second type of liability cost would result from bystander injuries that do not lead to
death. The Rice Study calculates alcohol-related losses in 1985 from severe and critical injury
to be $160 million and from minimum and moderate injury to be $898 million, totalling $1.058
billion. RICE, supra note 7, at 284 tbl. D-8 (adapting Blincoe's Study for the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, tbl. 5, at 6 (1987)). That figure includes injuries to those who are
drinking as well as bystanders. If we assume the percentage of those injured who are bystanders
is the same as the percentage of nondrinkers who are killed in alcohol-related accidents (onethird), see infra note 104, the loss to bystanders is $353 million. But this figure does not include
recovery for pain and suffering. Using the litigators' rule that pain and suffering damages will
be roughly three times the special damages, pain and suffering damages would be $1.058 billion,
for total personal injury damages of $1.412 billion. Rice estimates property damage from
alcohol-related accidents in 1985 at $842 million. RICE, supra note 7, at 284 (adapting Blincoe,
supra). If we assume that one-third of that figure is bystander loss, bystander property loss totals
$281 million. The total damages for bystander losses would be:
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As the price of alcohol increases, however, the danger increases that
consumers will purchase unregulated alcohol from manufacturers that have
avoided the liability system, as well as the taxation system.'0°

Wrongful death
Personal injury
Property damage
Total

James

$3.700 billion
1.412 billion
.281 billion
$5.393 billion

Alcohol manufacturers, however, would not pay that amount. Drunk drivers and their
liability insurance companies would bear a substantial portion of bystander losses (directly
through the claims of bystanders or indirectly through the indemnity and contribution claims of
alcohol manufacturers). Alcohol manufacturers probably would pay, primarily, those amounts
that were not paid by drivers' insurance companies. Given the number of uninsured drivers, and
the likelihood that a higher percentage of drunk drivers would be uninsured, the sum is likely to
be substantial. A recent study found between 19.6% and 28.4% of California drivers to be
uninsured. L. MARowrrz, UNINSURED MOTORISTS: THEIR RATE AND COST TO INSURED
MOTORISTS, FINAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA iv (December
1991). And, of course, many drivers would not have sufficient insurance to pay a $500,000
wrongful death judgment. For our purposes, we will make a very big assumption: drunk drivers
and their insurance companies would bear half of the $5 billion bystander loss. Manufacturers
are left with liability to bystanders of $2.5 billion. If we further assume that manufacturers
would pass these costs to consumers, the $2.5 billion in liability costs would be a 4.5% increase
in the $56 billion that consumers paid for alcohol in 1985. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1988 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 42-29 (1988) (reporting that U.S.
alcoholic beverage personal consumption expenditures were $56,248 million).
The effect that such a price increase might have on consumption would depend on the price
elasticity of demand for alcohol. A study of the effect of increases in price on U.S. purchases
of alcohol over a 40 year period concludes that alcohol has a price elasticity of -.5, David Levy
& Neil Sheflin, New Evidence on ControllingAlcoholUse Through Price, 44 J. STUD. ALCOHOL
929, 934 (1983), which means that for every 1% increase in price, there would be a .5%
decrease in demand. If this price elasticity were consistent for a price increase of 4.5%, that
would mean that with such an increase in price, consumption of alcohol would drop 2.25%.
A determination of the effect that such a decrease in consumption would have on safety
would require additional speculation. Those who will bear the greatest expense caused by the
rise in cost will be heavy alcohol users. The rise in prices is unlikely to have a big impact on
the consumption of alcoholics because their demand for alcohol is likely to be very inelastic. But
demand among young drivers is likely to be much more elastic in light of the fact that they have
less disposable income. See Douglas Coate & Michael Grossman, Change in Alcoholic Beverage
Prices and Legal Drinking Ages: Effects on Youth Alcohol Use andMotor Vehicle Mortality, 12
ALCOHOL, HEALTH & RES. WORLD 22 (1987). This fact is of special significance since young
drivers are involved in a high percentage of fatal accidents. In 1984, 35% of the drivers involved
in fatal accidents were under the age of 25, but only 20% of the licensed drivers were under 25.
Id. at 22 (citing NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (1986)). One study of the effect
of alcohol price increases on driving safety found that "deaths from motor vehicle accidents
appear to decline at a statistically significant rate among all young people when the price of beer
increases." Id. at 25.
102. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 24, at 1289. Imposing liability on manufacturers
can create "what economists refer to as 'second best' problems: targets of burdensome
governmental regulation, when possible, will seek to escape the burdens by substituting
unregulable (and in this context, possibly riskier) modes of behavior." Id. at 1310. These second
best problems, of course, can occur whenever products liability is expanded, taxes are raised, or
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Henderson and Aaron Twerski suggest that if courts impose liability on
manufacturers for injuries that nondefective products cause to bystanders and
consumers, black markets would develop and create a great increase in the
number of injuries from contaminated alcohol."'3
Of course, the degree to which an increase in products liability will
encourage the development of black markets will depend on the amount of the

increase in costs that liability will create. Imposing liability on the manufacturer for bystander injury would have a much smaller impact on the price of

most products than imposing liability for both consumer and bystander injury
because alcohol causes substantially fewer bystander injuries than consumer
injuries." ° Alcohol manufacturer liability for bystander injury would give

rise to alcohol price increases of approximately 4.5%." °

Such a price

increase would be unlikely to generate a substantial increase in the use of
unregulated alcohol.
IV. LIABILITY THEORIES

The previous sections discussed, both as a matter of fairness and as a
matter of consequences, whether manufacturers of alcohol and other hedonic
products should be subject to liability for injuries to bystanders arising from
product use. This section will consider both the existing theories of liability
and a potential theory of liability that might enable bystanders to recover from
manufacturers.
A. Abnormally DangerousActivity Liability
Under abnormally dangerous activity liability, defendants are subject to

a product safety regulation is adopted.
103. Id. at 1312.
104. Approximately one-third of the 23,000 people killed each year in alcohol-related traffic
deaths are bystanders. Compare Rice, supra note 7, at 118 (stating that in 1985 alcohol
consumption caused 23,190 traffic deaths) with DRUNK DRIVING FAcTs, supra note 2, cited in
Manning, supra note 2, at 1604 (stating that 7400 of those killed in alcohol-related accidents in
1985 had not consumed alcohol). Alcohol also kills a substantial number of consumers through
disease. See infra notes 179-85.
Another dangerous hedonic product that might give rise to bystander liability under the
theory discussed in this article is tobacco. There would be a great difference between the impact
of imposing liability on tobacco manufacturers for all tobacco-related injuries and merely
imposing liability for bystander injury from second-hand smoke. Whereas tobacco causes
approximately 300,000 consumer deaths a year, Donald W. Garner, Cigarettes and Welfare
Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269, 271 (1977) (citing HAROLD S. DIEHL, TOBACCO AND YOUR
HEALTH: THE SMOKING CONTROVERsY 33-34 (1969)), it only causes between 2490 and 5160
bystander deaths each year, David B. Ezra, Note, Smoker Battery:An Antidote to Second-Hand
Smoke, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1065 (1990) (citing Michael P. Eriksen et al., Health Hazards
of PassiveSmoking, 9 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 47, 62 (1988)).
105. See supra note 101.
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strict liability for damages caused from their dangerous and in some way
unusual activity. 2I" This cause of action is based on the theory that, even
though defendants may act reasonably, if the activities are unusually
dangerous, and the defendants engage in them for their own purposes, the
defendants should pay. t"
Commentators and courts have differed over the justification for
abnormally dangerous activity liability. George Fletcher suggests that courts

impose this strict liability because the defendants are exposing others to
unreciprocated risk. 08 A risk is unreciprocated if a defendant exposes
others to a risk to which they are not exposing the defendant. An unreciprocated risk theory may justify imposing liability on alcohol manufacturers for
alcohol-related injury to innocent bystanders."°
Even considering that
manufacturers spread liability costs to consumers, the unreciprocated risk

106. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1938); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§
519-520; KEETON, supra note 56, § 78, at 548-51.
This basis of liability has its roots in Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.T.R. 220 (H.L. 1868). In
Rylands the court imposed liability on a defendant who stored water in ponds, which leaked into
the plaintiff's underground mining shafts. The defendant was not negligent. Lord Blackburn,
justifying his finding of liability in the court below, stated as follows:
mhe person who, for his own purposes, brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief, if it escapes must keep it in at his peril, and if
he does not do so is primafacie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
consequence of its escape.
Id. at 222 (quoting Blackburn, L.).
The House of Lords affirmed the decision for the plaintiff, but justified the holding
differently. Whereas Lord Blackburn suggested that the basis of liability was that the thing
causing the injury was "likely to do mischief," Lord Cairns based the defendant's liability on a
"non-natural use" of the land. Id. at 221. A "non-natural use" use is one that is uncommon in
the area. Id. Lord Cairns contrasted the defendant in Rylands, a non-natural user, with the
defendant in Smith v. Kenrick, 137 Eng. Rep. 205 (C.P. 1849), whom Cairns considered a
natural user. Rylands, 3 L.T.R. at 221. In Smith water leaked from the defendant's mine into
the mine of the plaintiff. The distinction between the two defendants is that the defendant in
Smith engaged in mining, a common activity in the area, and was therefore a "natural" user; the
defendant in Rylands was engaged in an activity that was uncommon to the area, the storage of
water, and was therefore an "unnatural" user. People expected to be exposed to risks from
mining in England; they did not expect to be exposed to risks from water in artificial ponds.
Comment f to section 520 of the Restatement states: "The essential question is whether the
risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances
surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the harm which results from it.
. . ." RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 520 cmt. f. The risks created by alcohol are of great
magnitude. See infra part IV.C.1.a.
107. RESTATEMENT, supranote 1, § 519 cmt. d.
108. Fletcher, supra note 5, at 543-56. "If uncommon activities are those with few
participants, they are likely to be activities generating nonreciprocal risks." Id. at 547.
109. It is true that manufacturers of motor vehicles expose everyone to the risk of injury from
automobiles, but almost everyone either travels in or otherwise benefits from motor vehicles.
Alcohol greatly exacerbates the risks created by motor vehicles and makes what is a generally
reciprocated risk of motor vehicle travel a much greater and unreciprocated risk.
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argument may still justify liability. The consumers of alcohol, to whom the
risk would be spread, expose bystanders to unreciprocated risks." 0
Others justify abnormally dangerous activity liability on the grounds that

it forces those who engage in such activity to act efficiently."' Those who
engage in abnormally dangerous activities are capable of making adjustments
in their activities in light of the risks, whereas a bystander, who merely
engages in the ordinary activities of life, would generally find it difficult to
avoid the risk."' Thus, between the alcohol manufacturer and the bystander, the manufacturer can generally avoid costs more cheaply."
Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states as follows:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following
factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;

(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;

and
(f) extent to which its value
to the community is outweighed by its
1 14
dangerous attributes.

No one factor must be present for there to be strict liability."'
Some of the above-mentioned factors support a bystander cause of action
against alcohol manufacturers, others do not. The first three factors support

a claim. Production of alcohol creates both a high degree of risk of harm to

110. See supra part II.E.
111. See, e.g., POSNER, supranote 5, § 6.5.
112. Id.; Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 24 (1980).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95. The cheapest cost avoider in the overconsumption cases is generally the drinker, and this Article suggests that the pressure of the threat
of liability remain on the drinker by giving the manufacturer a right of indemnity against the
drinker. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
Other commentators argue that compensation and risk-spreading justify expanding
abnormally dangerous activity liability. Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359, 395 (1951); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The
RevitalizationofHazardousActivity StrictLiability,65 N.C. L. REv. 257,292-93 (1987). They
do not suggest, however, how risk-spreading provides any limits for abnormally dangerous
activity liability. If a court were to build a liability system around risk spreading, it is difficult
to see any limits to enterprise liability.
114. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 520.
115. Id. § 520 cmt. f. "Any' one of [the factors] is not necessarily sufficient of itself in a
particular case, and ordinarily several of them will be required for strict liability. On the other
hand, it is not necessary that each of them be present, especially if others weigh heavily." Id.
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others and a substantial likelihood that the harm will be great." 6 In addition, there is little likelihood that the manufacturer could eliminate the risk
with any activity short of terminating production.
The other factors may not support liability. The fourth factor is the
"extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage. "' 17 The
comments to the Restatement suggest that an activity which is not a matter of
common usage is one that is not engaged in often or by many."' Some
cases have suggested that common usage turns not on whether the activity is
common, but on whether many people engage in it. For example, although
many farmers have their fields dusted, cropdusting is abnormally dangerous
because there are not many cropdusters. ' 19 Plaintiffs suing alcohol manufacturers could argue that although the consumption of alcohol is common within
our society, the number of manufacturers is few. Manufacturers might
respond that this extension of abnormally dangerous activity liability to alcohol
manufacturers would open the door to expanded liability for other products.
Automobiles, for example, though they are quite common, are dangerous, and
are also produced by a relatively small number of manufacturers.
It may be that behind the "not a matter of common usage" factor is the
unreciprocated risk argument for abnormally dangerous liability. Those who
engage in dangerous activity that is not a matter of common usage expose
others to unreciprocated risk. If unreciprocated risk is behind this factor, it
justifies imposing liability on alcohol manufacturers, but not on automobile
manufacturers. Automobiles are so common that they do not expose others
to an unreciprocated risk. Almost all people avail themselves of the benefits
of automobile travel, and therefore expose others to this risk. However, as
stated previously, it may be that alcohol manufacturers (and the consumers
who would ultimately, through risk spreading, bear the cost) expose others to
unreciprocated risk. Therefore, the manufacturing of alcohol may be
considered not common.
The fifth factor in determining whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous is "inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
on." 20 The risks of alcohol do not turn on the location of its production.
Thus, this factor does not support a case against the manufacturer of alcohol.
The sixth factor is the "extent to which [the activity's] value to the
community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes."12 A later section
will consider the very complicated question of whether the costs of alcohol
outweigh its benefits."
116. See infra part IV.C.I.a.
117. RESTATEMENT, supranote 1, § 520(d).
118. Id. § 520 cmt. i.
119. Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312, 316-18 (Or. 1961); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567
P.2d 218, 223 (Wash. 1977) (en bane).
120. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 520(e).
121. Id. § 520(t).
122. See infra parts IV.C.1-2. That section concludes that this question is very difficult and

Published by Scholar Commons, 1994

29

SouthSOUTH
CarolinaCAROLINA
Law Review,
Vol.REVIEW
45, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 4
LAW

[Vol. 45:269

A final problem with imposing abnormally dangerous activity liability on

alcohol manufacturers is that courts generally do not treat the manufacture of
products as an activity, and therefore do not apply abnormally dangerous
activity liability to manufacturers."
However, "manufacture and distribution separately are 'activities'-just as much as any other steps in the process
24
of injecting a product into the stream of commerce and human activity."
The underlying principles of abnormally dangerous activity liability may

justify not extending liability to manufacturers of some products. As noted
previously, when applying the unreciprocated risk justification to products, the
appropriate question is whether the purchasers of that product, who would
bear most of the liability expenses, expose others to unreciprocated risk."z
In the case of dangerous products that the vast majority of people use, such as
automobiles, the risk is reciprocated and liability is not justified. However,
in the case of alcohol the risk is not reciprocated and, therefore, liability may
be justified.
As to the cheapest cost avoider justification for abnormally dangerous
activity liability, the user of most products may be the cheapest cost avoider
and, thus, leaving liability solely with the user is sufficient. As argued
previously, however, alcohol misusers are unlikely to be affected by the risk
of liability, and, as between the bystander and the manufacturer, the
manufacturer is likely to be the cheapest cost avoider. 126
B. ProductsLiability: Failureto Warn
When products cause injury to plaintiffs, plaintiffs may bring negligence,

warranty, and/or strict liability in tort causes of action against manufactur-

ers. 127 A plaintiff's theory under each of these causes of action may be that

a legitimate question of fact in negligence cases. See infra text accompanying notes 216-21.
123. See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir.
1984). Contra Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W.2d 820 (Ark. 1949) (holding creation
of pesticides that caused injury to plaintiff's cotton to be an abnormally dangerous activity); see
also Andrew 0. Smith, Comment, The Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns as an
Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 369, 384-85 (1987) (arguing that the
manufacture of some products, such as handguns, might subject the manufacturer to abnormally
dangerous activity liability).
124. Smith, supranote 123, at 384.
125. See supra part II.E.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
127. Strict products liability first developed, not as a tort theory, but as a warranty theory.
The purchaser of a product was able to recover against the seller, not because of any negligence,
but because of the failure of the product to meet the actual or implied terms of the contract.
Though courts originally developed warranty law through the common law, legislatures codified
warranty law, first in the Uniform Sales Act, see UNIF. SALES ACr §§ 12, 14, 15, 1 U.L.A.
173, 207, 213 (1950), and now in the Uniform Commercial Code, see U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to -315
(1989). In most jurisdictions, strict products liability in tort gives plaintiffs all of the rights that
are granted by warranty law, except that under warranty law, plaintiffs can recover for economic
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the product was defectively manufactured, had a defective warning, or had a
defective design. Under a manufacturing defect theory, plaintiffs must show
that the product turned out differently than the manufacturer intended. Since
this article is concerned with "good" whiskey, which turned out as the
manufacturer intended,' it will not discuss defectively manufactured alcohol
cases.

This section will discuss the failure to warn theory of liability.

The

sections will discuss design defect theories in negligence and
following two 29
liability.1
strict
The focus of this article is on the bystander's cause of action. Most
bystanders will find it difficult to recover under a failure to warn theory.

However, a failure to warn theory may help some bystanders, specifically
children who are born with birth defects caused by fetal alcohol syndrome.

This section discusses the failure to warn theory briefly.13
Most courts require plaintiffs to show manufacturer negligence in failure
to warn cases, whether the cause of action is in negligence or strict products

liability.'

Courts impose liability on manufacturers that knew or should

2
have known about the risks involved and nonetheless failed to warn.
Manufacturers are not required to warn of dangers that are common knowl-

edge 133 or that are extremely unusual.

Some miswarning cases against

damages without showing physical harm and generally they cannot recover such damages under
strict products liability in tort. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal.
1965) (en bane). Contra Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
In most jurisdictions, injured persons are entitled.to the protections of strict products
liability law if they are persons that are foreseeably injured in light of the product defect. See
KEETON, supra note 56, § 100, at 703-04. In most situations, bystanders that are injured in
accidents arising from over-consumptionofalcoholare foreseeable plaintiffs, because the risk that
a consumer will drive while intoxicated is foreseeable.
128. See supra note 1.
129. See infra parts IV.C-D.
130. Several comments provide helpful discussions of this potential theory. Stacy M. Andreas,
Note, A Casefor Alcohol Beverage WarningLabels:Duty to Warn ofDangers of Consumption,
53 Mo. L. REv. 555 (1988); Natalie K. Chetlin, Comment, In Support of Hon v. Stroh Brewery
Co.: A Brewing Debate Over Extending Liability to Manufacturersof Alcoholic Beverages, 51
U. Prrr. L. REv. 179 (1989); Rhondetta Goble, Note, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: Liabilityfor
Failureto Warn - Should LiquorManufacturersPick up the Tab?, 28 J. FAM. L. 71 (1989-90);
Clarke E. Khoury, Note, Warning Labels May Be Hazardousto Your Health: Common-Law and
Statutory Responses to Alcoholic Beverage Manufacturers'Dutyto Warn, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
158 (1989).
131. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. j; see also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974).
132. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1088.
133. See, e.g., Height v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 461 A.2d 757, 758 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div.), cert. denied, 468 A.2d 244 (1983). The RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt.
j, states as follows:
Directionsor warning. In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container,
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alcohol manufacturers have alleged that the plaintiff was injured because
alcohol causes intoxication. These claims have been dismissed on the basis
that the dangers of alcohol consumption are common knowledge. 34
In two recent cases, however, appellate courts have held that alcohol

manufacturers may be subject to liability for injuries to consumers for the
failure to inform them of risks that are not a matter of common knowledge.
In Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co. 35 plaintiff's deceased drank two or three cans

of beer per night, four nights a week, for six years. He died of pancreatitis
at the age of 26.36 Plaintiffs expert expressed the opinion that the consumption of the beer was a cause of the pancreatitis and that the public is
unaware that moderate use of alcohol can cause a serious risk to health.' 37
The trial court dismissed the claim. 38 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the finder-of-fact could conclude
that the knowledge of this risk is not common knowledge and could find that
the manufacturer should have warned consumers of the risk. '39
In Brune v. Brown Forman Corp.1'4 the plaintiff's deceased, a college
freshman, consumed straight shots of tequila and died from acute alcohol
poisoning.1 4' The Texas Court of Appeals held that the finder-of-fact must
determine whether the risk of death from alcohol poisoning is a matter of
common knowledge; thus, the question of common knowledge should have
1 42
been left to the jury.

as to its use....

But a seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in
them, which are only dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in excessive
quantity, or over a long period of time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger,
is generally known and recognized. Again the dangers of alcoholic beverages are an
example, as are also those of foods containing such substances as saturated fats,
which may over a period of time have a deleterious effect upon the human heart.
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read
and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is
followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
134. See, e.g., Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189, 191-92 (7th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff
suffered physical and mental disabilities after consuming vodka for 20 years); Pemberton v.
American Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 692-93 (Tenn. 1984) (plaintiff'sminor son died
from ingestion of grain alcohol); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385,
388 (Tex. 1991) (plaintiffbecame alcoholic); Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578, 583
(rex. Ct. App. 1987) (plaintiff struck by drunk driver).
135. 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
136. Id. at 511.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 510-11.
139. Id. at 514.
140. 758 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
141. Id. at 828.
142. Id. at 831. ContraPemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 69293 (Tenn. 1984) (denying recovery where plaintiff's minor son died from ingestion of grain
alcohol).
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These two cases will be of little help to bystanders who are injured by
intoxicated drivers. Whereas the risk of death from moderate consumption of
beer or from one-time overconsumption of tequila are not matters of common
kn6wledge, the risks associated with drinking and driving are common
knowledge. Even if a bystander could convince a court that the manufacturer
should have included a warning of the risks of drinking and driving, the
bystander would have a difficult time showing that the lack of a warning was
a cause-in-fact of the loss. The bystander would have to show that had a
warning been provided, the drinker would have heeded the warning and the

bystander would not have suffered the loss.
The cases that show some prospect for bystander recovery against an
alcohol manufacturer under a failure-to-warn theory are cases brought on
behalf of children who suffer from a birth defect disorder known as Fetal
Alcohol Syndrome (FAS), which is caused by their mothers' consumption of
alcohol during pregnancy. 43 FAS is estimated to occur in 1.9 out of every
1000 live births in the United States and is the leading known cause of mental

143. See Alcohol WarningLabels:Hearing on S. 2047Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,100th Cong., 2d Sess. 24
(1988) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Enoch Gordis, M.D., Director, National Inst. on
Alcohol Abuse & Alcoholism, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.). For other sources
discussing FAS, see NATIONAL INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROGRAM STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING FETAL ALCOHOL
SYNDROME AND ALCOHOL-RELATED BIRTH DEFECTS (1987) [hereinafter STRATEGIES FOR

PREVENTING FAS]; PAUL M. ROMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., WOMEN AND
ALCOHOL USE: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATuRE (1988); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH

(1990) [hereinafter SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT].
Clinical diagnosis of FAS requires three characteristics: growth retardation before or after
birth; face and head abnormalities such as small head circumference, small eyes, and flattened
facial features; and central nervous system dysfunction, such as mental retardation or abnormal
neonatal behavior. See, e.g., STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING FAS, supra, at 4. Some studies add
a fourth characteristic: major organ system malformations. SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra,
at 139. Follow-up studies show that some children's abnormal face and head features improve
with time. Less severely retarded children also improve in psychiatric assessments, but those
severely retarded showed no improvement. Id. at 140.
Animal studies suggest that binge drinking, resulting in peak blood alcohol levels, may be
more damaging to the fetus than the same amount of alcohol ingested over a longer period of
time. Id. at 144. Other factors not related to alcohol such as smoking, poor diet, and poor
general health may both contribute to fetal abnormalities and combine with alcohol use to affect
the fetus.
Another adverse effect of heavy maternal alcohol intake on the fetus is Fetal Alcohol Effects
(FAE). Children who suffer from FAE have birth defects but do not have all the characteristics
of FAS. FAE include eye and ear defects, heart murmurs, fingerprint abnormalities, and other
complications or birth defects that can be attributed to alcohol use during pregnancy. See
Hearing, supra, at 24; STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING FAS, supra, at 4; ROMAN, supra, at 25;
SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra, at 139. For a helpful discussion of the possibility of an FAS
cause of action, see Goble, supra note 130.
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retardation.' 44 One study showed that 2.5% of the mothers who abused
1 45
alcohol during pregnancy gave birth to a FAS baby.
The risks of FAS are sufficiently significant that a manufacturer should
warn consumers of them. The risks were documented in studies published in
1968146 and 1973,147 and a manufacturer who failed to warn consumers of
the risk after the publication of these studies might be subject to liability. A
plaintiff suffering from FAS would have to show that the failure to warn was
a cause-in-fact of the injury. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the
mother would have heeded a warning had the manufacturer given one.
Beginning in 1989, federal law required alcohol manufacturers to warn
consumers of the risk of FAS;14 1 therefore, the FAS failure to warn cause
of action is likely to have a limited life.
C. Products Liability: Negligent Design
Another products liability theory that the bystander might use against
alcohol manufacturers is that of defective design. Defective design can arise
as a theory under either a negligence or strict liability cause of action. This
section will discuss negligent misdesign; the following section will discuss
strict liability misdesign.
During the last twenty-five years, the major area of development of
products liability has been strict products liability in tort. However, a recent
article by James Henderson and Ted Eisenberg demonstrated that the
development of strict products liability slowed during the 1980's and may have
come to a "quiet" halt.' 49 In another article, Henderson and Aaron Twerski
liken the development of products liability to the settlement of the North
American continent and suggest that courts have reached the Pacific Ocean,
leaving no new territories to be settled. In particular, they suggest that courts
have stopped moving toward applying strict products liability based on the
dangerousness of an entire category of products. 5 0
Though, like the early explorers of North America, we may have pushed
quickly to the outer limits of products liability law, vast territories along the
way have not even been explored. A manufacturer's negligence for production

144. See Hearing, supra note 143, at 24.
145. SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 140.
146. Lemoine et al., Les Enfants de ParentsAlcooliques:-Anomalies Observees, 25 SOCiETE
FRANCAISE DE PEDIATRiE 830 (1968), cited in Goble, supra note 130, at 74 n.20.
147. Kenneth L. Jones et al., Pattern of Malformation in Offspring of Chronic Alcoholic
Mothers, 1 LANCET 1267 (1973), cited in Goble, supra note 130, at 74 n.21.
148. Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act, 27 U.S.C. § 213 (1988).
149. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability:An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 479 (1990).
150. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 24, at 1269.
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of a category of products may be such a territory."'5

With a slowing, and

possibly a halt, to the development of strict products liability, the most fruitful
opportunity for development of a bystander's cause of action may not be a new

cause of action, but an old cause of action: negligence. This section will
consider the possibility that manufacturers are negligent for simply producing
alcohol.
1. Negligence's Cost/Benefit Test
Alcohol is such a common part of American life that it might be difficult
for a judge or jury to consider the possibility that manufacturers might be
negligent for creating it. Two-thirds of Americans drink alcoholic beverages,
and alcoholic beverages are sold in most restaurants, convenience stores, and
grocery stores. Consumption of alcoholic beverages is a well established
American custom; service is a sign of hospitality. 5 2 But as to the issue of
5
negligence, custom is supposed to be merely evidence of reasonable care. 1
An entire industry may engage in a practice that is unreasonable; 54 an entire

society may do so as well.
A manufacturer is negligent if it produces a product whose costs outweigh
its benefits. 55 The costs and benefits that the finder-of-fact must consider

151. See KEETON, supranote 56, § 96, at 688-89.
152. We associate alcohol with summer ("those days of soda and pretzels and beer"), romance
("the days of wine and roses and you"), relaxation ("it's time to relax"), and good times ("it
doesn't get any better than this").
153. See, e.g., In re The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737,740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662
(1932). When an industry practice is at issue, the court or jury can stand apart from the practice
and be objective about whether the practice is unreasonable. Those within our society may have
difficulty determining whether alcohol manufacture is unreasonable because they would have to
stand apart from the society that has become accustomed to alcohol consumption as a common
activity.
154. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740 (stating that the entire business of tugboats "may have unduly
lagged in the adoption of new and available [receiving set] devices," but courts must say in the
end what is required and reasonable).
155. The Restatement develops the way that the benefits and risks of an activity are weighed
in a negligence analysis in the following manner:
§ 291. Unreasonableness; How Determined; Magnitude of Risk and Utility of
Conduct
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of
harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such
magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the
particular manner in which it is done.

§ 292. Factors Considered in Determining Utility of Actor's Conduct
In determining what the law regards as the utility of the actor's conduct for the
purpose of determining whether the actor is negligent, the following factors are
important:
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include not only the costs and benefits of the product to the consumer, but also
the costs and benefits to all of society. 5 6 In the early days of the develop-

ment of strict products liability, William Prosser dismissed the possibility that
alcohol's costs might outweigh its benefits and render the manufacturer of
alcohol negligent. 57 Nevertheless, an evaluation of alcohol's costs and
benefits indicates that the question is not so easy to answer. Such an

evaluation calls into question the reasonableness of the manufacturer's decision
to produce alcohol.

a. The Costs of Alcohol
Alcohol abuse creates tremendous costs, both to the drinker and to the

(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interest which is to be
advanced or protected by the conduct;
(b) the extent of the chance that this interest will be advanced or protected by
the particular course of conduct;
(c) the extent of the chance that such interest can be adequately advanced or
protected by another and less dangerous course of conduct.
§ 293. Factors Considered in Determining Magnitude of Risk
In determining the magnitude of the risk for the purpose of determining whether the
actor is negligent, the following factors are important:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interests which are imperiled;
(b) the extent of the chance that the actor's conduct will cause an invasion of
any interest of the other or of one of a class of which the other is a member;
(c) the extent of the harm likely to be caused to the interests imperiled;
(d) the number of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded if the risk
takes effect in harm.
RESTATEMENT,

supranote 1, §§ 291-93.

The benefits of a product may be balanced against its risks through a formula that was
developed by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d
Cir. 1947). Judge Hand suggested that whether a defendant acts negligently is a function of three
factors: (1) the probability of injury, (2) the gravity of any injury, and (3) the burden of adequate
precautions. Id. at 173. Judge Hand illustrated the relationship between these factors by an
algebraic formula. A person is negligent if B (the burden of adequate precaution) is less than the
risk created by the activity, which can be calculated by multiplying P (the probability of injury)
times L (the injury that might occur). Id. As Judge Hand has acknowledged, the values of these
variables are generally "incommensurable." See Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d
Cir.), rev'd, 312 U.S. 492 (1940). However, the Hand formula helps illustrate the interrelationship between these factors.
156. Cf. Conway, 111 F.2d at 612.
157. Prosser has stated:
Where only negligence is in question, the answer as to [products that are unavoidably
dangerous, including whiskey,] is a simple one. The utility and social value of the
thing sold clearly outweighs the known, and all the more so the unknown risk, and
there is no negligence in marketing the product.
William L. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J, 9, 23
(1966).
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rest of society.15 1 It causes traffic and other accidents, addiction, serious
159
medical problems, birth defects, crime, reduced productivity, and death.
This section will discuss each of the costs that alcohol creates to society and
the possibility of quantifying those costs. The discussion will draw from two
major studies which addressed the social costs of alcohol consumption. The
Rice study, published in 1990, attempted to quantify the social costs of alcohol
in the United States during 1985.1 The Manning study, published in 1991,
addressed the social costs of alcohol during 1986.16'
Traffic and OtherAccidents - Three sources of evidence help establish the
effect that alcohol has on traffic accidents. First, performance tests reveal that
alcohol impairs driving performance, that the degree of impairment increases
with a higher blood alcohol concentration (BAC), and that almost every
individual suffers substantial impairment with a BAC above. 10%.62
Second, accident studies show that a high percentage of drivers involved
in fatal crashes were intoxicated. In comparison to a driver who has not been
drinking, a driver with a BAC of .05% is about two times as likely, a driver
with .10% BAC is seven times as likely, and a driver with .15% BAC is
twenty-five times as likely to be involved in a fatal collision.163 One study
found that 43 % (19,918) of the 46,386 traffic fatalities in 1987 were alcoholrelated. '6
Substantial disagreement exists over the reliability of using the BAC of
drivers involved in fatal accidents to identify accidents that are actually caused
by alcohol. For example, the study which found 43 % of traffic fatalities to
be alcohol-related identified an accident as alcohol-related if (a) the investigating officer determined that alcohol was involved, (b) the driver had a BAC of
.10% or more, or (c) an officer issued a citation for driving while intoxicated.' 65 This study also suggested, however, that this identification process

158. "[A]lcohol is a two-headed beast; it causes behaviors that are destructive of others and
society, on one hand, and holds millions in the grip of addiction, on the other." Claude M.
Steele & Robert A. Josephs, Alcohol Myopia: Its Prized and Dangerous Effects, 45 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 921, 921 (1990).
159. One study links 60% of fatal pedestrian accidents, 64% of homicides, 75% of stabbings,
50% of marital violence, 67% of sexually-aggressive acts against children to alcohol use.
Hearing, supra note 143, at 61-62 (statement of John A. Morris, Jr., M.D., Vanderbilt Univ.
Medical Center); see also SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 171-74 (discussing
relationship between alcohol use, crime, and family violence).
160. RICE, supra note 7.
161. Manning, supra note 2.
162. Cook, supra note 8, at 64-67 (discussing studies).
163. David A. Sleet etal., Introduction:Drinking,Driving, andHealthPromotion, 16 HEALTH
EDUC. Q. 329, 329 (1989) (citing NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANSP., ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY 1984: A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE

16-18 (1985)).
164. Terry S. Zobeck et al., Years of PotentialLifeLost and Other Trends in Alcohol-Related
Fatal Traffic Crashes: 1977-1987, 14 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD 63, 64 (1990).
165. Id.
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underesiimated the number of accidents that were alcohol-related because
police officers often are reluctant to judge whether someone is intoxicated,
they do not administer BAC tests consistently, and they commonly do not issue
citations for driving while intoxicated in fatal crashes." Other commentators argue that statistics attributing all deaths in alcohol-related accidents to the
alcohol overstate the number of deaths actually caused by the alcohol:
The true figure is smaller, in part because some of those accidents
involving drunk drivers were not those drivers' fault. Perhaps more
important is the possibility that people who drive while drunk often have
personality attributes that make them dangerous drivers even while sober.
Donelson notes that "Limited research . . . suggests that such personal
attributes as hostility, alienation, impulsiveness, inability to cope with
stress, and rebelliousness are more frequently found in groups of high-risk
drinking drivers." If so, then drunk driving is a marker for dangerous
driving, as well being a cause. Thus an intervention that was successful
in reforming habitual drunk drivers would not reduce their involvement in
serious accidents to the level of the rest of the population. 67
Regardless of the exact percentage of accidents that alcohol causes, the
third type of evidence clearly establishes that alcohol does cause a high
percentage of automobile accidents. Studies on the effect of changes in the
availability of alcohol, such as changes in excise taxes and in the minimum
purchase age, "demonstrate that such interventions have a clear and important
1 68
effect on traffic fatalities."
The Rice study calculated that alcohol caused 34,863 deaths from traffic,
air, water, fire, and other accidents in 1985.169
Crime and Suicide Alcohol use has been associated with assaultive and sex-related crimes,
serious youth crime, family violence toward both spouses and children,

166. Id.
167. Cook, supra note 8, at 64-65 (quoting Donelson, The Alcohol-Crash Problem, in
MICHAEL LAURENCE, SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE DRINKING DRIVER

(1988)).

168. Id. at 65.
169. RICE, supra note 7, at 118 tbl. 47. Of these deaths, the Rice study estimated that there
were 23,190 motor vehicle traffic accident deaths. Id. The Rice study estimate of the number
of deaths due to drunk driving is based on the assumption that alcohol caused 51% of the 45,866
traffic accident deaths. Id.
Although the 34,863 accident deaths caused by alcohol, coupled with the 8329 alcoholrelated deaths from homicide and legal intervention, id. at 119 tbl. 47, constitute only 46% of
the 94,768 total alcohol-related deaths, the accident and crime deaths account for 80% of the life
years lost due to alcohol because of the young ages of many who die from accidents and crime.
See Cook, supranote 8, at 63 (citing Centers for Disease Control, Alcohol-RelatedMortality and
Years of PotentialLife Lost-United States, 1987, 39 MORBmrr & MORTALITY WKLY.REP.,
March 23, 1990, at 11).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4

38

307
LIABiLrTY
TO BYSTANDERS
MANUFACTURERS'
ALCOHOL
1994]Cochran:
Good Whiskey,
Drunk Driving,
and Innocent
Bystanders: The Respons
being both a homicide victim and perpetrator, and persistent aggression as
an adult. Alcohol 'problems' occur disproportionately among both
juveniles and adults who report violent behaviors. 70
A study of prison inmates in the United States found that over half had been
drinking immediately prior to the offense for which they were incarcerat11
ed.

As with traffic accidents, however, the fact that many drink while
committing crime does not in itself prove that drinking causes crime. One

who has decided to commit a crime may drink for courage or drink to have
an excuse. 172 However, other evidence supports the conclusion that alcohol
use causes crime. Studies show that drinking engenders aggressive behavior, 173 and that there is a reduction in crime in communities in which alcohol
becomes unavailable.174
One study estimated the costs of alcohol-related crime to the government
and persons other than drinkers to be $3.1 billion.175 The Rice study
calculated the losses suffered by those who commit crimes while drinking to
be $342 million in private legal defense expenditures and $2701 million for
incarceration.176 The Rice study estimated the number of alcohol-related
deaths resulting from homicide and legal intervention in crime in 1985 to be
8329'" and the number of suicides committed because of alcohol to be
3828.178

Disease - Alcohol abuse can lead to a host of medical problems, including
malnutrition, damage to the stomach, and pancreatitis, 179 strokes and other
heart problems, 8 0 damage to the immune, endocrine, and reproductive
systems,"' and cancer of the liver, esophagus, nasopharynx, and larynx."18
170. Cook, supra note 8, at 67 (citing Fagan, Intoxicationand Aggression, in M. TONRY &
J. WILSON, CRIME AND JUSTICE (1990)).

171. Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
172. See id. at 69.
173. See, e.g., id. at 68 (discussing studies).
174. See, e.g., id. at 69-70.
175. See Cook, supra note 8, at 55 n.10 (calculating the criminal justice costs from the
Manning Study, supra note 2).
176. RICE, supra note 7, at 20 tbl. 7.
177. Id. at 119 tbl. 47.
178. Id.
179. Heavy alcohol consumption inhibits the metabolism of proteins, carbohydrates, lipids,
vitamins, and minerals, thus impairing the absorption of nutrients into the body. This
impairment, combined with the poor eating habits of many alcohol abusers, may cause
malnutrition that often accompanies alcohol dependence. SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra note
143, at 116-17.
180. Alcohol can cause degeneration of the heart muscle and cardiac arrhythmias. Heavy
consumption is thought to increase hypertension, contribute to poor blood circulation to the heart,
and contribute to strokes. Id. at 117. However, moderate consumption may have a beneficial
impact on the heart. See infra note 203.
181. SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 123. Alcoholic men commonly experience
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Liver difficulties account for the greatest number of alcohol-related medical
problems.18 The Rice study estimates that alcohol caused 47,748 deaths
from disease in 1 9 8 5 .114 Alcohol abuse also causes both short and long-term
brain disorders, inhibiting the ability of the drinker to think clearly. 11
Birth Defects - Abuse of alcohol by pregnant women causes birth defects
to their children. One study estimates that in 1984, 7024 children were born
with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS).' 86 The Rice Study estimates FAS costs
in 1985 to be $1.6 billion." 8
Addiction and its Effect on the Family - In low doses alcohol acts as a
stimulant; in high doses as a depressant. Continued use creates increased
levels of tolerance-requiring more alcohol to produce a given effect, and
physical and/or psychological dependence. '
The medical profession
reproductive disorders such as impotence, low testosterone levels, low sperm count, and testicular
atrophy. Studies indicate that alcohol use by women may suppress hormonal activity. Id.
182. Alcohol is associated with increased risk of cancer of the liver, esophagus, nasopharynx
and larynx. Id. at 121. Alcohol alone appears not to be a carcinogen, but may negatively affect
the enzymes that control carcinogens. Id. at 122. For example, one study indicates that the risk
of esophageal cancer is much higher when drinking and smoking are combined than when only
one habit is sustained. Id. at 121. "[A]Icohol may both facilitate and promote delivery of
carcinogens and then impair immune protective or repair mechanisms" that would normally fight
the cancer. Id. at 122.
183. Most metabolism of alcohol takes place in the liver, which can be severely affected by
alcohol abuse. Heavy alcohol use results in damage to the liver in three ways: fatty liver,
alcoholic hepatitis, and cirrhosis. Abstinence can reverse fatty liver and alcoholic hepatitis, but
cirrhosis is permanent. Ten to twenty percent of heavy drinkers develop cirrhosis, the great
majority suffer fatty liver, and ten to thirty-five percent develop alcoholic hepatitis. Cirrhosis
was the ninth leading cause of death in the nation in 1986. Id. at 107. One study estimated that
almost fifty percent of deaths due to cirrhosis may be misdiagnosed, so that the cirrhosis mortality
rate may be substantially understated. Id. at 108. The Rice study attributes 7466 cirrhosis deaths,
1077 fatty liver deaths, and 766 alcoholic hepatitis deaths in 1985 to alcohol. RICE, supra note
7, at 118 tbl. 47.
184. RICE, supranote 7, at 118-19 tbl. 47. This figure includes deaths that the Rice study lists
as "Alcohol - Main Cause," deaths that it attributes to alcohol from "Malignant Neoplasms," and
diseases listed as "Other Alcohol-Related Causes."
185. Alcohol abuse is a well known cause of brain damage, resulting in dementia, blackouts,
seizures, and hallucinations. SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 123. Short-term or
'acute" exposure to alcohol at low doses may result in changes in mood, anxiety level, motor
performance, and cognition. At higher doses, alcohol can act as a sedative or anesthetic. Id. at
69. Both acute and chronic exposure result in memory disorders, from short periods of memory
loss to chronic inability to learn new material. See NATIONAL INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE &
ALCOHOLISM, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
ALCOHOL 2 (1988).

HUMAN SERVS.,

PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF

186. RICE, supra note 7, at 153 (citing Abel & Sokol, Incidence of FetalAlcohol Syndrome
and Economic Impact of FAS-Related Anomalies, 19 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 51
(1987)).
187. Id. at 154 tbl. 65 (adapting figure from Abel & Sokol, supra note 186, at tbls. 4-6).
188. SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 69. Physical dependence "manifests itself
by intense physical disturbances when . . . alcohol stops being administered." Psychological
dependence is "a condition in which . . . alcohol produces a craving that requires periodic or
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characterizes alcoholism as a disease similar to hypertension, diabetes, and
coronary artery disease in that environmental factors activate a genetic
Alcoholics may lack internal signaling
predisposition for the disease. '
mechanisms that would allow them to limit their consumption and gauge their
level of intoxication. This impaired control, combined with expectations of
the desirable effects of alcohol consumption, can lead to a vicious cycle of
alcoholism; 9° those with impaired control drink large amounts of alcohol,
pass out, and, waking with a hangover, drink more alcohol to feel better. The
use of alcohol for relief creates alcohol craving and an increasing tolerance
level, requiring more and more alcohol before the desired stimulating effects
occur. 191

Another part of this section discusses alcohol-related crime,'" but
alcoholism has a tremendous effect on those close to the alcoholic that does
not show up in crime statistics. In particular, alcoholics cause great problems
to other members of their families. As clinical psychologist Robert Deutsch,
testifying before a United States Senate Subcommittee, stated:
Alcoholism is a family disease. By that I mean that active alcoholism
in a family always affects every family member. .

.

. In the alcoholic

family system, all activities revolve around the common thread: the drug
alcohol. The alcoholic family is comprised of two groups: the active and
the reactive members. The alcoholic is the active member, while the
remaining family members all live in reaction to the alcoholic.
Family members live in a constant hyper-vigilant [s]tate, metaphorically walking through life on emotional eggshells, never knowing when the
alcoholic will act out in an intoxicated and uncontrolled fashion, never
understanding why the alcoholic in the family drinks and behaves in such
an inappropriate fashion.
.. . [The] children often grow up with excessive self-blame, anger,
and guilt, never feeling special, never experiencing unconditional family
love, never trusting significant others in their life [sic]: It is no wonder
that these early childhood experiences translate into adult issues, such as
a fear of success, interpersonal distrust, poor self-worth, and a shamebased sense of self. 193

continuous administration of the drug to produce pleasure or to avoid discomfort." Id. at 81.
Both kinds of dependence may characterize addiction and be virtually inseparable. Id.
189. Id. at 6. See generally id. at 43-68 (effects of genetics and environment on alcohol use);
Ting-Kai Li & Jane C. Lockmuller, Why Are Some People More Susceptible to Alcoholism?, 13
ALCOHOL HEALTH & REs. WORLD 310 (1989) (discussing the biological and psychosocial factors

that can influence drinking).
190. SEVENTH SPECiAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 6.
191. Behavior:Alcohol Use and GreatExpectations, 132 Sci. NEWs, Oct. 3, 1987, at 218.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 170-77.
193. Breaking the Cycle: The Effects of Alcohol on Families: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
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Studies have linked excessive alcohol consumption with child abuse 94
and spousal abuse. 95 Except in the rare situations where it is reported to

police authorities, this abuse and emotional suffering is unaccounted for in the
studies that attempt to quantify the costs of alcohol to society.
Reduced Productivity - The Rice Study calculated the morbidity costs,
"the value of goods and services lost by individuals unable to perform their

usual activities because of [alcohol] disorders, or to perform them at a, level
of full effectiveness," to have been $27,388 million in 1985.196 In addition
to causing lowered productivity, alcohol is a leading cause of death. Previous
sections discussed alcohol deaths due to accidents, disease, and crime. At
least three out of one hundred deaths in the United States is directly attributable to alcohol." 9 The Rice Study attributes 94,768 deaths in 1985 to
alcohol abuse. 198 It estimated the present value of productivity loss due to
alcohol related death in 1985 at $30,628 million (if discounted at four percent)
and $23,983 million (if discounted at six percent).1 99
Lost Opportunity Costs - In addition to these costs, reduced productivity
also carries with it lost opportunity costs. If alcohol were not available,
on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm'n on Labor and Human
Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1991) (statement of Robert Deutsch, Clinical Psychologist,

West Hartford, Conn.).
194. E.g., Richard Famularo et al., Alcoholism and Severe Child Maltreatment, 56 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 481 (1986).

195. E.g., Brenda A. Miller et al., Spousal Violence Among Alcoholic Women as Compared
to a Random Household Sample of Women, 50 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 533 (1989).
196. RICE, supra note 7, at 93, 98 tbl. 35. On a per person basis, this figure translates to an
average lost income by those with alcohol disorders as follows:
Age

Loss per Person
Male
Female

PercentLoss of Income
Male
Female

18-24

$131

$75

25-34
35-54

807
1958

484
2141

3.0
5.5

2.8
11.9

55-64

2295

1900

9.3

18.7

1.4%

0.8%

Id. at 104 tbl. 40.
197. SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 1. Studies have found alcohol use to
increase the risk of fatal injury, including suicide, motor vehicle crashes, bums, falls, and
drowning. E.g., Robert F. Anda et al., Alcohol and FatalInjuriesAmong US Adults, 260 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 2529, 2529 (1988). One study showed that the more drinks an individual consumed

per occasion, the more likely that person was to die from fatal injuries. For example, persons
consuming five to eight drinks per occasion were twice as likely to die as those drinking less than

five, and persons consuming nine or more were 3.3 times more likely to die from injuries. Id.
See generally SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 163-71 (discussing relationship
between alcohol use and accidents, suicide, and trauma victims).
198. RICE, supra note 7, at 117. "The United States Centers for Disease Control estimates

'alcohol-related mortality' for 1987 to be 105,000, 4.9 percent of all deaths in that year." Cook,
supra note 8, at 52 (citing Centers for Disease Control, supra note 169, at 11).
199. RICE, supra note 7, at 131 tbl. 54.
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consumers would spend money on something else, and the work, machinery
and supplies that go into producing alcohol could be used to produce
something else. The net benefit of these other activities is one of the costs of
alcohol production. Such opportunity costs would have to be offset by the
negative impacts that some of these other activities and products would
have-if people could not drink, some would engage in more destructive
activities, such as use of heroin. Of course, it would be very difficult to
measure the lost opportumity costs of alcohol."
The Total Cost - The Rice Study calculated the total cost (in millions of
dollars) of alcohol in 1985 as follows:
Treatment
Support
Morbidity
Mortality
Crime Expenditures
Motor Vehicle Crashes
Fire Destruction
Social Welfare Administration

Victims of Crime (loss of time)
Incarceration
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
Total

$6315
495
27,388
23,983
4251
2584
457
88

465
2701
1611
$70,338 201

These costs, of course do not include the pain and suffering, both physical and

200. It is not appropriate to consider the jobs created by the alcohol industry as a benefit.
[Tihe utility associated with capital is not unique to a particular activity over the long
run. Jobs and tax dollars lost to one community as a result of disinvestment
eventually will surface elsewhere, and hence from a society's point of view it is not
meaningful to associate such a generic utility with a particular activity.
Smith, supra note 123, at 389 n.94. It is probably more appropriate to treat the jobs created by
the alcohol industry as a lost opportunity cost. If most of the people employed by the alcohol
industry were not producing alcohol, they would probably be producing something else. Most
of the money now spent on alcohol probably would be spent on other products and services.
201. RICE, supranote 7, at 4 tbl. 2, 20 tbl. 7.
The Harwood Study calculated the social costs in 1980 to be $89,526 million. H. HARWOOD
ET AL., ECONOMIC COSTS TO SOCIETY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE AND MENTAL ILLNESS:
1980 (1984), cited in RICE, supra note 7, at 32. For a discussion of the differences in results in

the Harwood and Rice studies, see RiCE, supra note 7, at 167-204.
The costs of alcohol to society can be compared with the costs that studies have found
tobacco and abuse of other drugs create to society. There were between 300,000 and 360,000
smoking deaths per year in the United States during the 1960's. Garner, supra note 104, at 271
& n.20. Estimates of the cost to society from smoking (including the costs to the smokers) range
from $4.23 billion to $12 billion. Id. at 286-90.
Rice studied both the costs of alcohol and the costs of drug abuse and found the costs of
drug abuse to be $44.1 billion. RIcaE, supra note 7, at 2.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1994

43

SouthSOUTH
Carolina
Law Review,
Vol.
45, Iss. 2 [1994], Art.
CAROLINA
LAW
REVIEW
[Vol.4 45:269

emotional, that is experienced by alcoholics and the members of their families.

b. The Benefits of Alcohol
One in every ten Americans is a problem drinker, but many more of the
two-thirds of American adults who consume alcoholic beverages do so

responsibly.'

Alcohol consumption in moderation has benefits, such as

2°
reducing stress and coronary heart disease 3 and increasing longevity.
The major benefits of alcohol are social, including the enjoyment and the
pleasant social environment that alcohol creates.
A judge or jury might place a value on alcohol based on testimony of its

beneficial effects. Or they might try a more scientific approach and attempt
to place a value on alcohol using the methods of economists. Economists
attempt to place a value on products by determining the value that consumers
place on them. Making such a calculation for any product is difficult;
calculating consumer value of alcohol it especially difficult.
In attempting to determine the value that consumers place on alcohol, we

can start with what they actually pay. In 1985, the year that the Rice Study
20 5
evaluated, U.S. consumers spent $56,248 million for alcoholic beverages.
But the value that consumers place on a product is not what consumers pay,
but what they would be willing to pay.2°6 Generally people place a higher

value on things than what they pay for them-that is why people buy them.
202. Furthermore, more than three million problem drinkers are under 18 years of age.
Hearing, supranote 143, at 123 (statement of Arnold F. Fege, Director, Governmental Rel., The
Nat'l PTA).
203. Ronni Sandroff, Happy HourRevisited? Good News: The Alcohol-Breast CancerScare
Reports Were Exaggerated. ButBefore You Say "Bottoms Up" . . ., HEALTH, June 1988, at 31,

34. "Used judiciously, alcohol does reduce anxiety, social discomfort and stress - all of which
have been found to contribute to a number of health disorders." Id.
Several studies indicate that alcohol, used in moderation, may increase the level of highdensity lipoprotein (HDL), which carry cholesterol from tissue to the liver where it can be broken
down. High HDL levels are associated with reduced risk of heart disease; therefore, moderate
consumption of alcohol may help prevent heart disease. See id; Elizabeth M. Whelan, To Your
Health, 25 ACROSS THE BOARD, Jan. 1988, at 49, 51. But see NATIONAL INST. ON ALCOHOL
ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL CONSEQUENCES

OF ALCOHOL 3 (1988) (suggesting that alcohol does not raise the level of the particular HDL
believed to protect against coronary heart disease). This conflict probably indicates that further
research is required on this issue.
204. Whelan, supra note 203, at 51. According to data going back to 1926, and confirmed
on tens of thousands of people since, light or moderate drinkers tend to live longer than abstainers
and heavy drinkers. Numerous studies have shown that people who enjoy about two drinks a day
have a chance at longer life than those who drink more or less, including those who don't drink
at all. Id. at 53. Perhaps as "Jack Rabbit" Smith Johanson, a cross-country skier at age 103,
once suggested, "'The secret to a long life is to stay busy, get plenty of exercise, and don't drink
too much. Then again, don't drink too little.'" Id.
205. 1988 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK, supra note 101, at 42-29.
206. See POSNER, supranote 5, § 1.2.
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The difference between what consumers would be willing to pay and what they
actually pay is called consumer surplus. The first difficulty in determining
how much consumers value alcohol is determining consumer surplus.
Consumer surplus is a function of the elasticity of demand, the degree to
which consumers would be willing to pay more for a product than they
pay.'
One study has calculated that as to small changes in price, the
elasticity of demand for alcohol is -0.5, which means that for every one
percent increase in price, there would be a 0.5% decrease in demand." 8
This calculation suggests that the consumer surplus provided by alcohol may
be substantial, but the elasticity of demand has been calculated for only small
changes in price. It would be very difficult to calculate how much people
would be willing to purchase if there were substantial price increases. A jury,
which would presumably be made up of some of the two-thirds of Americans
who drink, might have a pretty good sense of this willingness to pay.
A second complication in determining the value of a product is that
consumers pay more than money for alcohol. Recall that economists define

the value of a product as what consumers are willing to pay for it. One cost
that consumers pay for alcohol, in addition to the money that they pay for it,
is the risk to which they are willing to expose themselves. 2' To the extent
that consumers make an informed choice to expose themselves to these risks,
those risks are costs that consumers are willing to pay for the alcohol, and
therefore
should be considered in determining the value that they place on
it.210
A third complication in calculating consumer willingness to pay for
alcohol is that not all consumers of alcohol willingly and intelligently incur the
costs and the risks of alcohol. Some drinkers are not aware of all of the risks
that accompany consumption." ' In addition, the ability of drinkers to
evaluate risk diminishes with' 2 each drink - drinkers are subject to diminishing3
marginal reasoning ability - and many drinkers are also alcoholics."

207. Here, elasticity of demand is used to attempt to estimate consumer surplus. An earlier
section used elasticity of demand to attempt to estimate the reduction in purchases that would
accompany an increase in price. See supra text accompanying note 101 (citing Levy & Sheflin,
supra note 101, at 932-35).

208. Levy & Sheflin, supra note 101, at 934.
209. The Manning Study, one of the recent studies of the costs of alcohol, does not address
injuries to the consumer as a cost of risk-related habits such as smoking and heavy drinking
because this is an internal cost, one that is merely part of the cost that the consumer is willing
to pay for the product. See Manning, supra note 2, at 1604.
210. Including these costs in a calculationof product benefitproperly cancels out some of those
costs that we calculated in an earlier section. This problem is avoided by the Manning Study of
the costs of alcohol, which evaluates only costs to those other than the drinker.
211. See Christine Godfrey, Discussion of Professor Cook's Paper, in NEGATIVE SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 8, at 82, 86.
212. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 188-91.
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Christine Godfrey has argued that the alcoholic "derives no pleasure from
consumption. . . [and], therefore, receives no benefits from his expenditure
on alcohol."2" 4 It might be argued that the risks of alcoholism are part of
the cost that drinkers pay for their pre-addiction drinks, but it is unlikely that
consumers intelligently consider this risk when they begin to drink.2 15

2. Do the Costs Outweigh the Benefits? Who Should Decide?
Whether the costs of alcohol outweigh the benefits is a difficult question.
It is a matter which the finder-of-fact should resolve, however, so long as a
reasonable person could conclude from the evidence that the costs outweigh
the benefits.2 16 When we look at alcohol's benefits and costs, it is difficult
to say that there is not, at least, a legitimate question of fact.
A court or jury might attempt to place a dollar value on the costs and
benefits of alcohol and compare them.217 On one side of the equation might

214. Godfrey, supra note 211, at 86.
215. The Manning Study argues that the costs that alcohol and cigarettes create to those other
than consumers should be imposed on the products through taxes. See Manning, supra note 2,
at 1604. It makes the following comment concerning addiction to cigarettes, but the argument
applies to alcohol as well:
Smoking tends to start in adolescence or early adulthood, at a time when individuals
are not well informed and may not appreciate the consequences of their actions.
Cigarettes (and alcohol) are addictive, so it is more difficult to quit than to avoid
starting the habit. Because over 85% of smokers begin smoking before age 20 years
and some evidence suggests that the proportion of those under 20 years of age who
smoke is sensitive to taxes, higher taxes may decrease the number of individuals who
become addicted.
Some may see this argument as paternalistic, but it is not, if judged by the tastes
of the individual attempting to quit; those tastes arguably determine the economically
efficient tax. If the loss in life expectancy of 28 minutes per pack is relevant to
economic efficiency because of later regret, an economically efficient tax would be
on the order of $5 per pack, the estimated value of the 28 minutes.
Id. at 1608-09 (footnotes omitted). The Manning Study, which in general argued that only costs
to those other than consumers should be considered when setting social policy, acknowledged that
the problems of consumers' lack of knowledge and addiction may justify imposing additional
taxes on alcohol. See id.
216. JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENcE 572 (4th ed. 1992).
217. If a judge or jury decides that the costs of alcohol outweigh its benefits, it will not be the
first time that this calculation has been made in this country. In the 1920's this country weighed
the costs and benefits of alcohol production and found alcohol wanting. This country adopted
the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting the production of alcohol. U.S.
CONST. amend. XVIII, repealedby U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
Prohibition was repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment, not because someone discovered
a new benefit of alcohol or neutralized one of its risks, but because the sale of illegal alcohol was
so profitable that organized crime experienced great growth.
Some might suggest that the experience of this country with prohibition serves as evidence
of the damage that imposing liability on alcohol production would cause. However, imposing
liability on alcohol manufacturers would not outlaw alcohol production, it merely would require
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be the Rice Study's estimate of the costs of alcohol ($70,338 million)218 plus

some amount for the pain and suffering of the injured and the emotional pain
of the family members of alcoholics plus alcohol's lost opportunity costs (the
value of things other than alcohol that would be purchased if alcohol were not
available). On the other side of the equation would be the amount that
consumers spend on alcohol ($56,248 million),219 plus alcohol's consumer
surplus (the amount consumers would be willing to pay above what they

actually pay), plus costs paid by consumers in things other than cash (such as
risk assumed), minus amounts paid by alcoholics as a result of their addiction.m
This obviously would be a difficult calculation to make. Many of the
required amounts (pain and suffering, opportunity cost, consumer surplus,
percentages of purchases resulting from addiction) probably would be
impossible to determine. That, however, does not mean that the issue of
manufacturer negligence should not be resolved. Juries constantly place a
value on things like pain and suffering and death. Juries constantly compare
incommensurable factors such as human life and efficiency.
The figures concerning costs and benefits of alcohol might be helpful to

alcohol to pay its way. Imposing liability on the manufacturer would raise the costs of legal
alcohol and might make the production of some bootleg alcohol cost effective. The costs to
society that might be created by this possible increase in the black market in unlabeled alcohol
are legitimately seen as a cost of imposing liability. However, assuming that the responsibility
of alcohol manufacturers is limited to bystander injuries, and the manufacturer is entitled to
indemnity from the intoxicated driver, as advocated herein (see supra text accompanying note 7780), the increase in cost is not likely to be so great that many consumers would subject
themselves to the dangers of unregulated alcohol.
218. See supra text accompanying note 201.
219. See source cited supra note 38.
220. If we could assume that all of the costs borne by drinkers, including monetary costs and
risks to them of death, injury, etc., are costs that they intelligently and voluntarily choose to pay,
we could eliminate those costs from both sides of the equation. Then the jury would only need
to compare the costs that alcohol imposes on those other than drinkers, which the Manning Study
calculatedto be $25.15 billion, see infra, together with the difference between alcohol's consumer
surplus and the consumer surplus of the goods that would be purchased if alcohol were not
available.
The social costs of alcohol, based on the Manning Study, are as follows (in billions
of 1986 dollars):
Nondrinkers' lives lost in traffic accidents
12.3
Net medical and pension costs to those other
than the injured drinker (5% discount rate)
5.5
Property damage from traffic accidents
3.6
Criminal justice costs
3.1
Fires and social program costs
.6
$25.15
Cook, supra note 8, at 55 n. 10 (calculating the costs from information in Manning, supra note
2, at 1607). The "net medical and pension costs" include medical care, sick leave, group life
insurance, nursing home, and retirement pension costs borne by those other than the drinker.
See Manning, supra note 2, at 1607.
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a jury, but the members of a jury will also have the benefit of their own
experience with alcohol (both its costs and its benefits) to help them determine
whether it is reasonable for manufacturers to produce it. The jury is likely to
include some of the two-thirds of the population who drink. Most will have
had some experience with others who drink, including those who have
drinking problems. A jury is likely to have a pretty good sense of the costs
and benefits of alcohol and to bring the wisdom of the community to this
issue. Such a determination may not be as exacting as we might prefer, but,
as Judge Hand suggested, the negligence calculation, by nature, requires the
court or jury to compare "incommensurable factors.""
3. An Inherent CharacteristicsRule for Negligence?
As we shall see in the following section, the inherent characteristics rule
in strict products liability prohibits courts from imposing liability for an aspect
of the product that is inherent in the product. The plaintiff must present an
alternate design of the product that would exclude the dangerous aspect of the
product.tm The justifications for the inherent characteristic's rule would
appear to apply to negligence, as well as strict products liability, cases.
Surprisingly, it appears that there has been little discussion among courts and
commentators on the issue of whether an inherent characteristics rule should
William Prosser, in an early discussion
apply in negligence cases. 2'
advocating the inherent characteristics rule in strict products liability, assumed
that there was no inherent characteristics rule in negligence cases. 224 If we
assume for present purposes that the inherent characteristics rule applies in
strict products liability misdesign cases, 225 the question is whether there is
reason for a different rule in negligent design cases.
The key difference, of course, between negligence and strict liability cases
is that in negligence, the manufacturer's culpability is at issue. It may be that
when a manufacturer's culpability is at issue, courts should not place the
inherent characteristics limitation on plaintiff's claims. Otherwise, plaintiffs
will be denied the opportunity to establish a claim that is based on culpability,
which would undercut the fairness that is at the root of the negligence
system. 6
221. See Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 312 U.S. 492 (1940).
222. See infra part IV.D.3.a.
223. It may be that courts have not had to deal with the question of whether an inherent
characteristics rule should apply to negligent design cases because plaintiffs have focused almost
exclusihely on strict liability in products liability misdesign cases. Perhaps, with the closing of
the products liability frontier, see supra text accompanying notes 149-50, plaintiffs and courts will
more carefully explore the rules that might apply to a negligent design theory.
224. See Prosser, supra note 157, at 23.
225. The discussion in the next section will conclude that either the inherentcharacteristicsrule
should not apply in cases of bystander injury, or bystanders should not have to show product
defect. See infra part IV.D.3.b.
226. In other areas of products liability courts deny plaintiff a strict liability claim for social
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4
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D. Strict ProductsLiability: Defective Design
In strict products liability design defect cases, most jurisdictions determine
whether a product is misdesigned under a consumer expectation test, a
benefit/risk test, or they allow plaintiffs to recover under either test.2 7
However, many jurisdictions do not allow plaintiff to argue that a product is
defective because of its "inherent characteristics.""
This section will
discuss the design defect tests, the inherent characteristics rule, and whether
this rule should apply to bystander's suing a manufacturer in strict products
liability.

1. The Consumer Expectations Test
Under the Second Restatement of Torts, a manufacturer is subject to
liability if a product is dangerous beyond the ordinary consumer's expectations. 29 This test appears to be the same as the test applied in warranty
cases under the Uniform Commercial Code.? 0 Plaintiffs will have difficulty

policy reasons, but allow plaintiff to seek to prove manufacturer negligence. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. k; see also infra part IV.E.5.
227. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
228. See infra text accompanying note 238.
229. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A(1) (stating that a manufacturer is subject to strict
liability if the product is "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer"). Comment g to § 402A defines a product in a defective condition as one which is
"in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous
to him." Id. § 402A cmt. g. Taken literally, of course, the definition would make a portion of
the Restatement redundant, for under the Restatement, the product must not only be defective,
it must be "unreasonably dangerous." Id. § 402A cmt. i.
It is unclear whether the standard to be applied under the Restatement is that of the
consumer of the specific product that caused the injury or that of the ordinary consumer. Though
comment g defines "defective condition" as "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him," id. § 402A cmt. g, comment i defines
unreasonably dangerous as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics." Id. § 402A cmt. i. It is highly unlikely that the drafters intended that
the test of whether the product is defective be a subjective one, the expectations of the plaintiff
consumer, and that the test of whether the product is unreasonably dangerous be an objective one,
the expectationsof the ordinary consumer. The two comments are best reconciled by interpreting
comment g, the less specific of the comments, in light of comment i. That is, the "ultimate
consumer" whose expectations determine whether a product is defective is not the specific
consumer that used the product at issue, but one who would ordinarily be the ultimate consumer
of such products. Otherwise, the manufacturer would be subject to liability based on the
testimony of consumers in their individual cases as to their expectations. Manufacturers would
find it difficult to design products so as to protect themselves from liability, and plaintiff/consumers would be tempted to testify concerning their expectations in a self-serving manner.
230. Under § 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code, sale of a product by a merchant carries
with it an implied warranty of merchantability. U.C.C. § 2-214 (1989). A warranty of
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recovering from the alcohol manufacturer under a consumer expectations

theory, except for those plaintiffs who are injured by a risk of alcohol that is
not a matter of common knowledge, such as victims of fetal alcohol syndrome."
Overconsumption of alcohol creates alcohol's greatest risks, and
most of the risks of overconsumption are common knowledge.n12

When a purchaser or a consumer sues a manufacturer under a misdesign
theory, it may be appropriate to limit the right of the consumer to recover
based on the ordinary consumer's understanding of the risks created by the
product. Consumers, unlike bystanders, have the opportunity to take steps for
their own safety and they have benefitted from the product. However, the
innocent bystander, who is in no way involved in the decision to purchase and
use the product, should not be denied recovery merely because the product's
risks are within the ordinary consumer's expectations. Though the consumer
expectation test makes some sense when applied to a products liability cause

merchantabilitywas also implied under the UNIF. SALES ACT § 15(2), 1 U.L.A. 213 (1950). The
test for merchantability appears to be the same as the consumer expectations test that is applied
in strict products liability in tort cases. Under § 2-314(2)(a) of the U.C.C., a product is
merchantable if it would "pass without objection in the trade under the contract description."
U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a). This standard looks to the expectations ofthose in the trade, which would
be the same as the expectations of the ordinary consumer, unless the expectations of consumers
and producers in the trade differ. White and Summers report that in most cases in which courts
have found breaches of the warranty of merchantability, the products "either did not work
properly or were unexpectedly harmful." JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-7, at 351 (2d ed. 1980). White and
Summers state that, except for the fact that the strict products liability portion of § 402A of the
Restatement does not normally apply to economic losses, a breach of the warranty of
merchantability under the U.C.C. and a defect under § 402A are "nearly synonymous" and they
"would expect a court to hold that any automobile which was not merchantable was also in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous." Id. § 9-7, at 355.
231. See supratext accompanying notes 143-48. Those plaintiffs who were in the womb after
the risks of FAS became common knowledge would not have a cause of action.
The plaintiff under a consumer expectationtheory is in a similar position to a plaintiff under
a failure to warn theory concerning risks that are a matter of common knowledge. See supra part
IV.B. Under either theory, plaintiffs lose if the risk is a matter of common knowledge. In one
respect, a consumer expectations design defect case is more advantageous to plaintiffs than a
failure to warn case because plaintiffs do not have the causation difficulties in a consumer
expectation design defect case that exist in a failure to warn case. In a consumer expectations
case, plaintiffs only have to show that if the product did not have the dangerous characteristic,
they would not have suffered the loss; whereas in the failure to warn cases, plaintiffs must show
that they would have heeded the warning had they known of the danger.
232. In rejecting the claim of bystanders injured by an 18-year-old intoxicated driver who
had consumed beer manufactured by the defendant, one court stated:
The ordinary consumer in today's society, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to the characteristics of the product, knows of the dangers of
driving while intoxicated. Whether or not this particular driver in the instant case
knew of the dangers is irrelevant, because comment i [of Restatement § 402A]
requires that only the "ordinary consumer" have knowledge.
Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4
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of action brought by a purchaser or consumer, it does not make sense when
applied to a cause of action brought by a bystander. As Harper and James
said of earlier limitations on bystander recovery, limiting the bystander to the
consumer expectation test is a "distorted shadow of a vanishing privity which
is itself a reflection of the habit of viewing the problem [of product injury] as
a commercial one between traders, rather than as part of the accident
problem."" Bystander recovery should not be limited by the expectations
of the consumer.
2. Strict Liability's Cost/Benefit Test
Strict liability's cost/benefit test is similar to the negligence design defect
test. As under the negligence test, the manufacturer is subject to liability if
the costs of the product' outweigh its benefits 34 In some respects, however,
the strict products liability cost/benefit test differs from the negligence test.
In many jurisdictions, the strict liability cost/benefit test varies from the
negligence test in that the cost that courts consider is the cost that is known
about at the time of trial,"5 rather than the cost that the manufacturer knew
about or should have known about at the time of manufacture. Under the
strict liability rule, the manufacturer is responsible for later-discovered risk.
This strict liability rule generally will not affect the liability of alcohol
manufacturers because manufacturers of alcohol have known about the vast
majority of risks of alcohol consumption for a long period of time."3
A second difference between cases brought under the negligence
cost/benefit theory and strict products liability cost/benefit theory is based, not
on a difference in the rule that courts would apply, but on what is likely to be
the judge or jury's reaction to the theories' labels. Even if they apply the
same cost/benefit test, a judge or jury may be more likely to call a product
"defective" under strict products liability than to call a manufacturer
"negligent" under negligence. A judge or jury might hesitate to call a
manufacturer culpable for engaging in an activity that has been so widely
accepted in our society for a long period of time. The strict liability theory
does not require the judge or jury to brand the manufacturer "negligent."

233. 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.16, at 1572 n.6

(1956).
234. This cost/benefit test for negligence is discussed supra parts IV.C. 1-2. In Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978), however, the California Supreme Court required
the defendant to show that the burden of using an alternative design was greater than the risks
of the product. The Supreme Court of Alaska adopted the Barkerapproach in Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885-86 (Alaska 1979).
235. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974) (en bane); Page
Keeton, ProductLiability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 38 (1973).
236. An exception may be the cases of children who are injured by Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
whose mothers were pregnant before the dangers of FAS were discovered. See supra text
accompanying notes 143-48.
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3. The Inherent CharacteristicsRule
A final difference between negligence and strict products liability's design
defect tests is that under strict products liability, many jurisdictions prohibit
courts from finding a defect if the aspect of the product that is alleged to be
defective is one of the inherent characteristics of that product.2 37 Under this
rule, the plaintiff cannot attack an entire category of products, such as alcohol,
cigarettes, butter, or asbestos. The plaintiff must present an alternative
product. This section will consider whether plaintiffs in a case against an
alcohol manufacturer might be able to present an alternative product and
whether it is appropriate to apply the inherent characteristics rule to a case
brought by a bystander.
a. A Safer Product?
If a plaintiff argues that the manufacturer should have made a safer
product, the trier-of-fact compares the burden of making the product safer with
the relative increase in safety of the product proposed by plaintiff. If the
burden of making the product safer is less than the increase in safety that the
alternative product would provide, the defendant's product is considered
defective.s
Initially, it might appear that a plaintiff who was injured by one who had
consumed hard alcohol might argue that the manufacturer should have
produced a less dangerous product, such as wine or beer. 9 A plaintiff
could argue that the probability of loss from production of hard alcohol is
greater than that from the production of less-intoxicating alcohol because
consumption of a small amount of hard alcohol can lead to intoxication faster
and therefore carries a greater risk of intoxication.
It would be difficult, however, to show that producing less intoxicating
alcohol would be safer. People can become intoxicated by merely drinking a
greater amount of the less intoxicating beverages. In fact, studies consistently
show that drivers who drink beer are more likely to drive while intoxicated
than those who prefer wine or distilled spirits.24 It may be that the less

237. See, e.g., Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1149 (Md. 1985). Some
jurisdictions allow a whole category of products to be defective without a showing of an
alternative product. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 545-47
(N.J. 1982).
238. See, e.g., Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Wilson v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 579 P.2d 1287 (Or. 1978) (en bane).
239. Plaintiff could argue that the manufacturer should have produced apple juice or bottled
water. This argument would be the equivalent of arguing that a reasonable manufacturer would
not have produced alcohol, an argument that is considered supra part III.C.
240. See, e.g., Dale E. Berger & John R. Snortum, Alcoholic Beverage Preferences of
Drinking-DrivingViolators, 46 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 232, 232 (1985) (discussing several studies).
Berger and Snortum conclude that this showing may be the case because beer costs less; beer
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4
advertising commonly associates drinking with groups (who may encourage others to drink more
and drink longer), with men (who drink more than women), and with risky activity (tending to
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intoxicating beverages are more dangerous because drinkers believe that they
will not get intoxicated and, as a result, intoxication is more likely to sneak
up on them. Plaintiffs injured from overconsumption of beer might argue
from these studies that beer is defective and that its manufacturers should
create hard alcohol instead. But if beer were not available, those who want
to drink might drink harder alcohol, and the enhanced intoxicating character
of the harder alcohol will render the same result - intoxication.
Even if a plaintiff could show that generally the elimination of a type of
alcoholic drink would create less risk, it would be difficult for plaintiff to
show that in a particular case the production of that type of alcohol, rather
than another type, was a cause-in-fact of the injury. Had the defendant's
product not been available, the drinker might merely have consumed a
sufficient quantity of another alcoholic beverage.
A plaintiff might argue that alcohol manufacturers should make nonalcoholic drinks such as L.A. Beer that taste like their alcoholic counterparts.
Courts would then have to determine whether the non-alcoholic alternative
would be a mere variation of the original product or an entirely different
product. Obviously, if plaintiffs could merely argue that the defendant could
have produced an entirely different product, frozen vegetables instead of beer,
they could defeat the purpose of the inherent characteristics rule. At what
point does an alternative product become an entirely different product, rather
than a safer variation of the original?
The test of whether the plaintiffs proposed alternative is a safer variation
of the original or an entirely new product might be whether the new product
retains what the ordinary consumer would consider to be the important
characteristics of the original. If it retains the important characteristics, courts
could allow plaintiffs to present the proposed product as a legitimate
alternative. In the case of alcoholic beverages, it is likely that the ordinary
consumer would consider its intoxicating character to be an important
characteristic. If one were to ask ordinary drinkers whether consuming
alcoholic beverages would alter their consciousness, they would be likely to
reply, "We certainly hope so." Thus, courts are likely to find that beverages
with no alcoholic content are different products, rather than safer improvements of their alcoholic counterparts.
Under the inherent characteristics rule, a court probably would be
precluded from finding that the manufacturer of alcoholic beverages is subject
to strict liability for losses suffered from intoxication because the risk of
intoxication is probably one of the inherent characteristics of alcoholic
beverages.

attract those who are risky); and beer is "popularly viewed as a drink of moderation that is less
dangerous than 'hard' liquor." Id. at 238; see also Perry F. Smith & Patrick L. Remington, The
Epidemiology of Drinking and Driving: Resultsfrom the Behavioral Risk FactorSurveillance
System, 1986, 16 HEALTH ED. Q. 345, 353 (1989) (reporting the following results of a survey:
"Among by
respondents
who reported1994
drinking and driving, 76% drank beer predominantly,
Published
Scholar Commons,
compared with only 48 % of drinkers who denied drinking and driving.").
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b. The Inherent CharacteristicsRule and the Bystander
Many jurisdictions have adopted the inherent characteristics rule based on
portions of comment i of section 402A of the Second Restatement. 241
Comment i discusses the possibility of imposing liability on manufacturers of
inherently dangerous products. It states:
Unreasonablydangerous. [Strict products liability] applies only where the
defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer. Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe
for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk
of harm, if only from over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly
poison to diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an
instrument of torture. That is not what is meant by "unreasonably
dangerous" in this Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics. Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous
merely because it will make some people drunk, and is especially
dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount
of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but
tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably
dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because,
if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart
attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous. 242
Though the language of comment i suggests that the non-defective
products listed in it are merely examples of products that have risks that are
not beyond the expectations of the ordinary consumer, William Prosser, the
Reporter of the Second Restatement, interpreted comment i to mean that
products are not defective if the danger that they create is an inherent
characteristic of the product.
The inherent characteristics rule asks whether a plaintiff should be denied
recovery because the risks of a product are inherent in the product. Should
the manufacturer of a product, whose inherent risks outweigh its benefits, be
exempt from liability? 2'
One justification for the inherent characteristics rule is that when

241. As noted previously, the RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. i, defines
"unreasonably dangerous" as dangerous beyond the expectations of the ordinary consumer. See
supra text accompanying note 229.
242. Id.
243. See Prosser, supra note 157, at 23, quoted in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d
1153, 1161 (Cal. 1972) (en banc).
244. In a benefit/risk jurisdiction, the law deals with the responsibility of the consumer who
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4
knows of the risk in its contributory negligence and assumption of the risk rules.
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consumers choose to expose themselves to the risks that are inherent in a
product, they should be responsible for the losses that they suffer. Consumer
responsibility may be at the root of comment i. All of the examples of nonde-

fective products in comment i (sugar, whiskey, tobacco, and butter) expose
consumers to risks of which consumers are commonly aware.24

Even when

comment i mentions alcohol, a product that creates great and obvious risks to
others, it discusses only the risks to the drinker: "Good whiskey is not

unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and
is especially dangerous to alcoholics .
"..."246 If consumers are or should
be aware of the inherent risks of a product, it may be reasonable to deny them

recovery.

7

But this justification does not apply to innocent bystanders who

have not assumed the risk. Bystanders should not be denied recovery based

on the knowledge of the consumer.
An additional argument for the inherent characteristics rule is that whether

the inherent risks of a product outweigh its benefits is a judgment that is better
made by consumers than juries. Consumers make a cost/benefit determination

when they decide whether to purchase a product. Some commentators argue
that if the consumer is aware of the risks that accompany a product, courts
should rely on the consumer's determination that the benefits outweigh the

risks.24

A recent Reporters' Study prepared for the American Law Institute

(ALI) advocates the inherent characteristics rule.249 It states:

245. It is likely that the drafters of the Restatement did not even consider the rights of the
bystander when drafting comment i. Section 402A did not even give the bystanders the right to
bring a cause of action. Indeed, comment 1 gave limited coverage to consumers. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. 1. However, comment o suggests that the authors did
not intend to limit coverage to consumers. See id. § 402A cmt. o. While there has been much
social pressure exerted by consumers for their own benefit, "there is not the same demand for
the protection of casual strangers." Id.
246. Id.
247. In negligence actions, the law traditionally denied recovery on this basis through the
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk defenses. See generally KEETON, supra note
56, § 65, 68, at 451-53, 480 (discussing these two defenses generally). Under strict products
liability, some jurisdictions only deny recovery if the plaintiff is both negligent and assumes the
risk, and others apply comparative fault. See Id.§ 102, at 710-12. The inherent characteristics
rule would preclude any plaintiff recovery, and may, therefore, be inconsistent with the strict
products liability defenses. On the other hand, the inherent characteristics rule may demonstrate
a difference between when consumers expose themselves to risks that are inherent in a product
and when they expose themselves to risks that result from a manufacturer error. In both cases,
the responsibility of the consumers are the same, they expose themselves to risks of which they
are aware. However, the manufacturer who exposes a consumer to a risk that resulted from an
error may have greater culpability than one who exposes a consumer to a risk that is an inherent
characteristic of the product.
Courts have applied the inherent characteristics rule to deny recovery to consumers for risks
to which they expose themselves. For example, courts have denied recovery to cigarette smokers
on the basis that the risk of cancer is one of the inherent characteristics of cigarettes. See, e.g.,
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd, 849 F.2d
230 (6th Cir. 1988); Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
248. See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994 43, at 48-49.
249. Id. at 48-56.
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The risk-utility test apparently permits juries to overrule buyers when
deciding whether a product has sufficient social utility. This is an error
because a product has sufficient social utility if informed consumers are
willing to purchase it given its costs, including accident costs. Under
the appropriate decision maker is the buyer, not
these circumstances
50
the jury.2
Perhaps the ALI Study's analysis is legitimate when applied to consumer
injury from most products, but weaknesses in the argument arise vhen it is
applied to bystander injuries, especially those caused by alcohol consumption.
First, the ALI Study's argument presumes informed (and presumably rational)

consumers.

However, such assumptions are not justified as to alcohol

consumers. Each drink limits the consumer's ability to rationally evaluate
whether to have another and some addicted consumers do not make a free
choice at all.
Second, the ALI Study assumes that when purchasing, the consumer will
consider the products' costs "including accident costs." Consumers may
consider consumer accident costs but are less likely to consider bystander
accident costs. Responsibility for considering the bystander's costs should not
be left entirely to consumers.211
The ALI Study's strongest argument is that juries would have difficulty
balancing all of the costs and benefits of a product. When asked to apply a
cost/benefit analysis to an entire category of product, "a jury is asked to act
in the same manner as a well staffed regulatory agency, but without the latter's

250. Id. at 48-49.
251. Perhaps a consumer who uses a product that causes unreasonable risk to a bystander
should be liable to the bystander, but the consumer's liability should not relieve the manufacturer
of liability to the bystander, especially when consumer abuse is likely as in the alcohol cases.
The ALI Study does not ignore bystanders. A footnote to the above-quoted portion of the
ALI Study text states:
This claim [that "tort law should rely on markets to decide what product designs
should be produced"] assumes that firms internalize risks to third parties and
consequently reflect these risks in prices. Firms are now required to internalize thirdparty risks through the bystander liability doctrine, which allows parties outside the
chain of distribution to sue the manufacturers of defective products.
ALI STuDY,supra note 43, at 49 & n.26. This argument incorrectly assumes that under current
law the cost of products internalizes all of the injuries to bystanders. As the footnote correctly
states, bystanders may "sue the manufacturers of defective products." Id. (emphasis added). The
ALI Study correctly sees that reliance on consumer choice to determine the optimal level of safety
will only yield the correct result if bystander losses are internalized in the cost of the product,
but it advocates a rule that would not internalize the costs of bystander injuries that result from
an inherent danger of the product. Manufacturers will only internalize the risks to third parties
if courts hold them subject to liability for injuries to third parties. If courts or legislatures do not
impose liability on manufacturers for injuries that products cause to bystanders, these injuries
become "external costs," costs to society that are not reflected in the product's cost. In
determining whether to use a product, the consumers take into consideration the risks that use of
the product creates to themselves, thereby internalizing the risks to themselves. The argument
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4
that injuries to bystanders should be internalized by imposing liability on manufacturers is
developed in a previous section. See supra part III.B.2.
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perspective, information, and expertise.""
Juries may be unwilling to
balance risks to life against dollars, an essential task in a cost/benefit
analysis.?53 Juries would find it difficult to calculate the benefits of an entire
category of products because of the difficulty of determining the value of
consumer surplus. 4 The difficulty of calculating all of the costs and
benefits of a product is illustrated by the previous attempt in this article to
balance the costs and benefits of alcohol5 5
On the other hand, the benefit/risk calculation that a jury would make of
an entire category of products, such as alcohol, lawn darts, or above ground
swimming pools, would be similar in many respects to the calculations that
juries make in determining negligence all of the time. Often, juries must
balance the benefits of an activity against the risk of loss of life. As Judge
Hand said, in negligence actions, the jury must compare "incommensurable
factors. ,,"s
As to widely used products, such as alcohol, some jury members are
likely to have personal knowledge of the benefits of the product, possibly
enabling a jury to render a fair cost/benefit judgment. The jury will have a
fair sense of the costs and the benefits that such products provide to society
and will bring the community's judgment to the issue. The jury may be able
to render a more intelligent answer to that question than it can to the question
whether the benefits of one automobile design is better than another.
Product manufacturers should not be exempt from bystander liability just
because the products's use creates an inherent risk. Maybe society so
commonly accepts alcohol that another product might better illustrate the
argument against applying the inherent characteristics rule to bystanders.
Assume that a bystander is injured in an automobile collision caused by a
driver high on crack cocaine. If the bystander can identify the manufacturer
of the cocaine, the manufacturer should not be relieved of liability because
addiction and intoxication are inherent dangers of crack cocaine. 7 The

252. ALI STUDY, supra note 43, at 53-54.
253. Id. at 54.
254. See Alan Schwartz, ProposalsforProductsLiabilityReform: A TheoreticalSynthesis, 97
YALE L.J. 353, 386-88 (1988).
255. See supra part IV.C.1-2. Dissenting in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., Justice Schreiber
rejected the inherent characteristics rule, stating: "Mhe jury will not be cognizant of all the
elements that should be considered in formulating a policy supporting absolute liability, because
it is not satisfactory to have a jury make a value judgment with respect to a type or class of
product.. .. " 463 A.2d 298, 310 (N.J. 1983) (Schreiber, J., dissenting), overruled by statute
as stated in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990). Justice
Schreiber advocated a rule similar in some respects to that discussed in the following section.
Based on an abnormally dangerous activities model, Justice Schreiber advocated that the court,
rather than the jury, resolve whether the product manufacturer should be subject to strict liability
for its inherent characteristics. O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 312.
256. See Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 312 U.S. 492 (1940).
257. The potential liability of manufacturers of crack cocaine differs from alcohol. Because
cocaine's manufacture is illegal, manufacturers would be subject to liability under negligence per
se. That legislation
does
not prevent1994
a manufacturer's actions does not protect the manufacturer
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drafters of the Restatement probably would not take the position that good
crack cocaine is not defective merely because it kills many of its consumers
and causes them to take the lives of others 5 8
If courts allow bystanders to recover from manufacturers of products that
have inherent risks, the courts have at least two options. One option is to hold
merely that the inherent characteristics rule will not apply to injured
bystanders. In cases of bystander injury, the jury could determine whether the
costs of a category of product outweigh the product's benefits. In cases of
consumer injury, consumers have already made this judgment-they have
concluded that the product's benefits outweigh whatever risks the product
carries. Therefore, it is appropriate in cases of consumer injury to deny
consumers the opportunity to have a jury reevaluate this decision. A rule
allowing the jury to make a cost/benefit determination in cases of bystander
injury would, of course, require the jury in bystander cases to do a difficult
cost/benefit analysis, but, as argued above, it may be that the jury, bringing
the wisdom of the community to the question, would be able to do so.
An alternative rule, would impose liability on manufactures of dangerous
products for bystander injury, irrespective of whether the costs outweigh the
benefits. Such a rule would avoid the necessity of a jury's cost/benefit
analysis. The rule would be consistent with the ALI Study argument-it would
leave consumers to determine whether the costs of a product outweigh its
benefits, but the costs that the consumer should consider when purchasing a
product should include the costs that the product imposes on bystanders.
Recovery by the bystander would internalize the costs of bystander injury in
the cost of the product, and leave the cost/benefit choice to the consumer. The
following section discusses the possibility of imposing such a rule on
manufacturers of dangerous hedonic products.
E. Stricter Liabilityfor Bystander Injury
from Dangerous Hedonic Products
Courts might impose liability on manufacturers of dangerous hedonic
products for injuries to bystanders through developments in abnormally
dangerous activity, negligence, or strict products liability. As this Part has
demonstrated, however, there are potential stumbling blocks to liability under
each of these causes of action. This section will consider whether courts
might impose liability on manufacturers of dangerous hedonic products for
bystander injury without requiring bystanders to show a product defect.
1. Distinguishingthe Old Strict ProductsLiability
One might ask whether it is realistic to talk of expanding strict products

258. Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. i (stating that "[glood whiskey is not
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4
unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and is especially
dangerous to alcoholics").
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liability today. As the 1980's witnessed a revolution at the federal executive
level, emphasizing individualism and less government involvement in business,
a parallel "quiet revolution" occurred in the courts, as courts slowed the
growth and even cut back on the movement toward stricter products liability.

259

However, the development in products liability that is discussed in this
section is consistent with the new products liability's emphasis on individual

responsibility, and in fact flows from it. Unlike consumers, who are generally
the plaintiffs in products liability actions, bystanders have not chosen to expose
themselves to product risks.
The difference between the way the old

philosophy of products liability law might respond to the problem of alcoholrelated injuries and the way that a new philosophy might deal with it can be

illustrated by comparing the two recent economic studies of the social costs of
alcohol.

The Rice Study included as a social cost of alcohol the costs to

drinkers, including their lost employment opportunities, medical expenses, and
injuries from traffic accidents. 2

°

It suggested, implicitly, that government

should attempt to reduce these costs. The Manning Study included as social
costs of alcohol only those costs that drinking imposes on those other than the

drinkers, and suggests that public policy should be concerned primarily with
26
these costs. '

259. See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 149.
260. RICE, supra note 7.
261. Manning, supra note 2.
[The Manning perspective] allocates the bulk of negative consequences to the private
sphere of concern, limiting the domain ofpublic concern to those consequences where
the drinkers' actions impose involuntary costs ("externalities") on other members of
society. In this view, people should be free to choose an unhealthy, risky life style
if that is their preference, and if they die young as a result, that is not a public
problem except to the extent that there are financial consequences for others. (If their
decisions place others at risk, then that is a matter of public concern.) For example,
in the [Manning] framework, the only traffic injuries to be "counted" are those in
which a drunk driver is responsible for causing an accident in which someone else is
hurt, whereas in the public health and economic frameworks, all alcohol related
accidents are to be counted. Thus estimates of the cost of alcohol abuse will differ
widely depending on the accounting principles that are selected.
Cook, supranote 8, at 71-72.
The ultimate implication of the Manning study is that a broad cost/benefit analysis is not
necessary. We do not need to calculate the consumer surplus that drinkers experience. We
should impose on drinkers the external costs created by alcohol and let them determine whether
the product is worth this additional cost. The underlying assumption of the Manning study is
similar to that of this article; government should be more concerned about losses that people
impose on others than those that they impose on themselves. Costs paid by the consumer are
internal costs. The costs that create the greatest inequity, as well as a disutility, are the external
costs that alcohol imposes on others. On the other hand, the studies that consider the costs to the
consumer as social costs, such as RICE, supra note 7, share a common philosophy with those that
argue that products liability law should shift losses suffered by consumers to the manufacturer
who can spread the risk to all consumers. See supra part III.A.
The Manning Study concludes that alcohol does not pay its way, that taxes on alcohol cover
only aboutbyhalf
of the costs
that alcohol
imposes on society, see Manning, supra note 2, at 1608,
Published
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and that taxes should be raised to a sufficient level to cover the additional external costs. It is
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The Rice Study is consistent with the goal of old products liability law
which imposed liability on manufacturers for injuries their products created in
order to spread the risk of consumer injury. The Manning Study treats only
those costs imposed on those other than the consumer as social costs, and is
consistent with this article's argument that alcohol manufacturers, and through
them, consumers, should bear the cost that they impose on injured bystanders.
2. A Three PartTest

It may be that courts or legislatures should hold manufacturers of alcohol
and other dangerous hedonic products subject to liability for injuries to
innocent bystanders.262 Under such a rule, plaintiffs would not have to
prove that the product is defective,263 but would have to meet three requirements that courts have not generally imposed in strict products liability cases.
They would have to show the following:
1) the product is dangerous;
2) the product is an hedonic product, that is, that it is primarily used for
purposes of entertainment and enjoyment; and
3) the plaintiff
was a bystander, i.e., one whom the product did not
264
benefit.

at this point that this article parts company with the Manning Study. Sufficient taxes to
internalize the costs might create the proper economic incentives for manufacturers and drinkers,
but they would do little to help the injured bystander. Courts or legislatures should allow injured
bystanders to recover from manufacturers for their injuries. Other costs of alcohol, which are
imposed on society as a whole, might properly be recovered through the tax system. The
Manning Study argues that the external costs would be internalized by raising the excise and sales
taxes on distilled spirits, wine, and beer (at the time of the Manning Study, the state and federal
excise taxes averaged $0.25, $0.03, and $0.09 per ounce of ethanol, respectively) to $0.48 per
ounce of ethanol. Id. On January 1, 1991, federal taxes on distilled spirits increased 8%, from
$12.50 to $13.50 per proof gallon (50% alcohol by volume); beer, 100%, from $9.00 to $18.00
per 31 gallon barrel; and wine, 629%, from $0.17 to $1.07 per liquid gallon. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1991 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 33-31 to -32
(1991). Based on the Manning Study's calculation of the social costs of alcohol, it appears that
beer and wine still do not pay their way (and this article would argue that what it pays, it pays
to the wrong party, the state rather than to injured bystanders) and that distilled spirits more than
pay their way (but to the wrong party).
262. Paul LeBel proposes that an alcohol tax fund compensate bystanders that are injured in
alcohol related accidents. See LEBEL, supra note 38, at 212-22.
263. Courts could impose liability for bystander injury on manufacturers of dangerous hedonic
products as a matter of law. Juries would not need to make a cost/benefit analysis, prices would
include the costs of bystander injury, and consumers would determine whether such products are
worth the costs that they create.
264. In addition to showing that the manufacturer should be subject to liability, plaintiff will
of course have to show that the manufacturer's production of alcohol was a cause-in-fact and a
proximate cause of damages. Cause-in-fact may be a problem in many cases. Traditionally,
plaintiffs had to show that without the manufacturer's production of the product, they would not
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4
have suffered the loss. In some alcohol cases the drinker may die in the automobile collision.
It may be difficult to show the brand of alcohol that the drinker consumed. In such cases, it
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Each of these factors, by itself, presents some justification for imposing strict
liability. However, when all of these factors are present, the justification for
manufacturers liability is very strong. To keep proper incentives on misusing
consumers, courts could give manufacturers a right of indemnity against
misusing consumers. 2'
Previous sections of this article present the justifications for manufacturer
liability when alcohol and other dangerous hedonic products cause bystander
injury. Hedonic products merely provide pleasure. Alcohol manufacturers
obtain benefits and bystanders suffer losses from the overconsumption of
alcohol and under the concept of corrective justice, these manufacturer gains
should be available to compensate bystander losses. Alcohol is dangerous, not
only because those who consume it are likely to drive negligently, but because
the product itself inhibits the ability of consumers to judge when they have had
too much.
Bystanders gain no benefit from the product and have not chosen to
expose themselves to any risk. It may be that the drunk drivers are the most
culpable parties in alcohol-related cases, but there is a substantial possibility
that they will be indigent, underinsured, or even uninsured. Alcohol is often
the root cause of their financial difficulties. A manufacturer's right of
indemnity will keep proper incentives on consumers that are able to pay.
Imposing liability would compensate bystanders for their losses and place
pressure on manufacturers to encourage safer use of their products.
Manufacturers would spread some of the risk of bystander injury to consumers. It is appropriate, however, that those who enjoy dangerous hedonic
products and help to create the risk pay a bit more so that injured bystanders
may be compensated. People should not enjoy risky entertainment at the
expense of others without providing some mechanism for compensation; they
expose others to unreciprocated risk. Imposing liability on the manufacturer
would internalize the cost of injury in the price of the product. Consumers
could then determine whether the benefits would be worth all of the costs of
the product.
3. The Risk of Greatly Expanded Liability
Courts may be concerned that imposing liability on manufacturers of
dangerous hedonic products for bystander injury would ultimately lead to
greatly expanded liability, as the right to recovery is extended beyond
bystanders to consumers. If courts allowed consumers to recover for injury

would be appropriate to apply a market share rule, under which manufacturers of alcohol that
could have caused the loss bear responsibility for the injury based on their market share of
alcohol in the region in which the drinker consumed the alcohol. Cf. Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607
P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (adopting market share rule for pharmaceutical drugs). Proximate cause should only be a problem in those jurisdictions that cut off liability
because of the culpability of the intervening actor, in these cases the drinker. See supra text
notes 17-19.
accompanying
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265. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
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from hedonic products, this would be a great extension of liability. There are
many hedonic products that create a great risk of consumer injury. Manufacturers of cigarettes, alcohol, footballs, boxing gloves, and a host of other
hedonic products that create risks to users, would be subject to hedonic
product liability for consumer injury.
But there are strong arguments against extending hedonic product liability
to consumers. The best argument against consumer recovery is that consumers
have made a choice to expose themselves to the risks that are created by these
products. Courts should not impose liability for injuries to consumers
resulting from the known, inherent characteristics of products. To do so
would be to paternalistically determine that citizens who engage in these
activities should pay higher prices so that they can be compensated for losses
that they will incur. Informed consumers are in the best position to determine
whether the benefits of products outweigh risks to themselves. Consumers
should be free to expose themselves to these inherent risks, but they should
provide a means for bystander recovery. Bystander loss should be internalized
in the price of the product.
Injured consumers might argue that denying them recovery for injuries
from dangerous hedonic products, while allowing bystanders such a recovery,
would be inconsistent with the rules that apply in strict products liability-assumption of the risk does not preclude recovery in most jurisdictions.266 However, the differences in the bases for current strict products
liability law and the proposed dangerous hedonic product liability justify
different rules as to consumers. Courts allow consumer recovery in strict
products liability cases based on the assumption that the manufacturer
produced a defective product. Hedonic product liability is based, not on the
theory that the manufacturer has produced a defective product, but on the
theory that all users of hedonic products should share responsibility for losses
suffered to injured bystanders. This theory provides no justification for
consumer recovery.
4. Supportfor Broader BystanderRecovery
The proposal suggested herein is a new one. There are not cases that
apply it, but there are rules that provide some support for both aspects of it,
for broader bystander recovery and for greater hedonic product manufacturer
responsibility.
As noted previously, the California Supreme Court, in dicta, suggested
that "[i]f anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the
consumer or user."267 Additional support for bystander recovery can be

266. Some jurisdictions allow plaintiffs a full recovery unless the manufacturer can show that
plaintiffs have both assumed the risk and acted negligently; other courts apply comparative fault
to the assumption of risk defense in strict products liability. See KEETON, supra note 56, § 102,
at 710-12.
267. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969) (en bane). For a
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4
discussion of Elmore, see supra text accompanying notes 61 to 62.
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found in the abnormally dangerous activity cause of action and in a Maryland
case holding manufacturers of handguns subject to liability for injuries to
innocent bystanders.268
Abnormally Dangerous Activity Liability269 - Warranty has had a great
impact on the development of strict products liability in tort,27 but it may

be that abnormally dangerous activity liability is the more appropriate
precedent when a product injures a bystander.27

Warranty law may be the

proper precedent when a purchaser or consumer is injured and the suit is
between those who benefit from the transaction. But in cases of bystander
injury, as in abnormally dangerous activity cases, one that does not benefit

from the activity suffers a loss.
Abnormally dangerous activity liability is bystander liability. The Alaska

Supreme Court explained its imposition of abnormally dangerous activity
liability on defendants for the storage of explosives by stating "[a]s between
those who have created the risk for the benefit of their enterprise and those
whose only connection with the enterprise is to have suffered damage because
of it, the law places the risk of loss on the former."272 In this respect,
manufacturers and consumers of dangerous products are like defendants in the
Manufacturers and consumers of
abnormally dangerous activity cases.

dangerous products benefit from the production of the products. Bystanders
who are injured by dangerous products are like plaintiffs in abnormally

dangerous activity cases. Bystanders are injured, and do not benefit from the

products.
The basis of abnormally dangerous activity liability is that those who
engage in a dangerous activity for their own benefit should pay for the losses

they cause to bystanders. Perhaps manufacturers and consumers who benefit

268. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
269. This article has already discussed the possibility of bystanders pursuing manufacturer
liability under abnormally dangerous activity liability. See supra part IV.A. This section
considers the possibility that abnormally dangerous activity liability might serve as precedent for
expanded strict products liability in bystander cases.
270. See supra note 127.
271. Though abnormally dangerous activity liability has not had as great an impact on strict
products liability as has warranty, it has had some impact. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §
524 cmt. a, states that "[s]ince the strict liability of one who carries on an abnormally dangerous
activity is not founded on his negligence, the ordinary contributory negligence of the plaintiff is
not a defense to an action based on strict liability."
One commentator suggested that courts might extend abnormally dangerous activity liability
to impose liability on manufacturers of nondefective dangerous products in cases involving all
categories of injured parties, consumers as well as bystanders. Diamond, supra note 94, at 531.
However, traditional strict liability is bystander liability. Extension of abnormally dangerous
activity strict liability to all categories of plaintiffs would go far beyond its underlying theory.
272. Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Alaska 1978).
The RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 519 cmt. d, states that "[abnormally dangerous activity
liability] is founded upon a policy of the law that imposes upon anyone who for his own purposes
creates an abnormal risk of harm to his neighbors, the responsibility of relieving against that harm
Courts
deny recovery to those who engage in the abnormally
when it does
in fact occur."
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from dangerous products should pay for the losses that such products cause to
others. As parts .E and IH.B. 1 supra argue, the other underlying bases for
abnormally dangerous activity liability, unreciprocated risk and imposing
liability on the cheapest cost avoider, also justify imposing liability on
manufacturers for bystander injury.
The Kelley Case - The Maryland Court of Appeals in Kelley v. R.G.
Industries, Inc.273 recognized a cause of action that is similar to the proposal
discussed herein when it allowed an innocent bystander injured during the
commission of a crime to recover from the manufacturer of a "Saturday Night
Special" handgun.274 The court held that abnormally dangerous activity
liability did not apply because the activity did not occur on the defendant's
land275 and that strict products liability did not apply because the risk of
injury from crime is an inherent risk of these guns. 276 The court, however,
adopted a new strict liability cause of action allowing innocent bystanders to
recover for injuries caused by "Saturday Night Specials."2'
The court imposed liability because the risks of "Saturday Night Specials"
outweigh their benefits to society, their criminal use is foreseeable, and as
between an innocent victim and the manufacturer of a product commonly used
in criminal activity, the manufacturer is more at fault.278 The Kelley court's
argument differs in some respects from that presented herein. This article
does not argue that the risks of alcohol outweigh its benefits or that the
manufacturer is at fault. Kelley, however, provides support for the cause of
action discussed herein by focusing on the bystander as an innocent victim and
contrasting the status of the bystander and the manufacturer.
5. Supportfor Stricter Hedonic ProductManufacturerLiability
Comment K: An Inverse Precedent- A precedent for basing the strictness
of products liability rules on the importance of a product to society can be
found in comment k to Restatement section 402A. Courts generally have
interpreted comment k to exempt prescription drug manufacturers from the
requirements of strict products liability.279 Most jurisdictions require the

273. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md.1985).

274. Id. at 1159.
275. Id. at 1147.
276. Id. at 1149.

277. Id. at 1153-60.
278. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1154-59. InKelley the court not only adopted a rule protecting
bystanders, but it imposed liability in spite of a highly culpable intervening actor, the criminal.
The intervening actor in Kelley was more culpable than the drunk driver in the alcohol cases.
Some courts have denied injured bystanders in alcohol cases recovery from negligent servers
because of the culpability of the drunk driver. See supra part II.F.
279. Comment k states as follows:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An
outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteurtreatment of rabies, which not
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plaintiff in a products liability action against the manufacturer of a prescription
drug to show that the manufacturer was negligent.2"' Among the reasons
courts have provided this protection to the product is "the public interest in the
development, availability, and reasonable price of drugs."28'
Courts have protected manufacturers of medical drugs from strict products
liability, under comment k, in spite of the fact that the arguments for strict

products liability also apply to medical products. 2"

Consumers could pay

uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected.
Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and
the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree
of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
The same is true of many otherdrugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this
very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of
a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to
which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience,
there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such
experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a
medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification
that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently
reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. k (emphases added).
Comment k, if taken at face value, would require a negligence standard for any products
that are "quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use." Id. This
requirement would include a wide variety of products, including asbestos and alcohol. Though
the comment never explicitly limits its application to prescription drugs, all of the references in
the comment to protected products are references to prescription drugs. See the portions of
Comment k above that are in italics. Since all of the examples enumerated in comment k involve
pharmaceutical products, one may reasonably conclude that the drafters intended to limit the
scope of this provision to drugs, vaccines, and similar products. Moreover, this interpretation
is amply supported by existing case law. Most comment k cases have involved either chemical
drugs, antibiotics, vaccines, blood, or medical devices.
The justifications that courts and commentators have advanced for comment k assume that
it will be applied to health care products. Courts justify comment k because if health care
products are subject to strict liability, some will be taken off the market and the price of others
will go up. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988).
280. See, e.g., Plummer v. Lederle Labs., 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 898 (1987); Brown, 751 P.2d at 475; Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305, 1318
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
281. Brown, 751 P.2d at 477.
282. One court stated as follows:
[Tihe fundamental reasons underlying the imposition of strict liability are to deter
manufacturers from marketing products that are unsafe, and to spread the cost of
injury from the plaintiff to the consuming public, which will pay a higher price for
the product to reflect the increased expense of insurance to the manufacturer resulting
from its greater exposure to liability.
These reasons could justify application of the doctrine to the manufacturers of
. . that the risk of injury from such drugs is
drugs.
It is indisputable.
prescription
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a bit more for medical products so that those injured from such products could
recover for their loss. The imposition of liability would likely cause
manufacturers to take additional safety steps.
Most courts, however, have held that the benefits of spreading the risks
of medical products do not outweigh the costs. Imposing strict liability has
negative consequences. When additional liability is imposed, manufacturers
are likely to either raise prices or withdraw products from the market. If they
raise the price of medical products, the poor will not purchase some medical
products. Comment k withdraws medical products from the risk of strict
liability because the continued availability and development of such products
is important to society.
The California Supreme Court, adopting comment k, stated:
[f]here is an important distinction between prescription drugs and other
products such as construction machinery, a lawnmower, or perfume, the
producers of which were held strictly liable. In the latter cases, the
product is used to make work easier or to provide pleasure, while in the
former it may be necessary to alleviate pain and suffering or to sustain
life.283
Comment k protects those products whose availability is most important to
society.
Courts might also draw a distinction between products that "provide
pleasure" and other products. Hedonic products are at the opposite end of the
importance spectrum from comment k medical products. Although hedonic
products have value, other products are more important because they provide
the necessities of life. Hedonic products provide the optional things of life.
There is little reason to be concerned about the failure of prospective buyers
to purchase hedonic products and good reason to insure that innocent
bystanders are compensated for their injuries by the manufacturers.
The O'Brien Case - Additional support for imposing liability on manufacturers of hedonic products can be found in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.2 4 In
O'Brien the plaintiff was injured when he hit his head while diving into an
above ground swimming pool manufactured by the defendant.2 85 The New
Jersey Supreme Court rejected the inherent characteristics rule and remanded
the case so that a jury could apply a risk/utility analysis.286
caused by them, and that, like other products, the cost of insuring against strict
liability can be passed on by the producer to the consumer who buys the item.
Moreover ....
in some cases additional testing of drugs before they are marketed
might reveal dangerous side effects, resulting in a safer product.
Id. at 478; see also Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products
Liability: What Liability Rule Should be Applied to the Sellers of PharmaceuticalProducts?, 78

KY. L.J. 705, 742-53 (1989-90).
283. Brown, 751 P.2d at 478 (citations omitted).
284. 463 A.2d 289 (N.J. 1983).
285. Id. at 302.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/4
286. Id. at 304-06.
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The O'Brien plaintiff would not be entitled to recovery under the cause

of action proposed herein. Though a swimming pool is an hedonic product,
the plaintiff was a consumer of the product, not a bystander.

He was

benefiting from the product and had the opportunity to inspect it for safety,
and does not deserve the special protection that this article argues courts
should give to bystanders. Nevertheless, the court suggested that hedonic
products might be more deserving of liability than other products. The court

stated, "The evaluation of the utility of a product also involves the relative
need for that product; some products are essentials, while others are luxuries.
A product that fills a critical need and can be designed in only one way should

be viewed differently from a luxury item." 2

The court's suggestion that

hedonic products might be subject to less protection than other products

supports the cause of action proposed herein.
V. CONCLUSION

This article advocates the extension of strict liability to manufacturers of
dangerous hedonic products that cause injury to innocent bystanders.
Manufacturers of alcohol should be liable to innocent bystanders who are
injured in traffic accidents arising from drunk driving. They create a very
dangerous product that merely provides pleasure. It is dangerous not only
because those who consume it are likely to drive negligently but because the
product itself inhibits the ability of consumers to judge when they have had too
much. It is ridiculous for manufacturers to suggest that a person who is
drinking should "know when to say when."
Drinkers may have chosen to expose themselves to risk of injury, but
bystanders gain no benefit from the product and have not chosen to expose
themselves to any risk. It may be that drunk drivers are the most culpable
parties in these cases, but they are likely to be indigent, uninsured or underinsured, and alcohol is often the root cause of their financial difficulties. If the
drinker cannot pay, then the manufacturer should pay. Most of the cost of
liability will ultimately be passed on to consumers in higher prices. It is
appropriate, however, that those who drink pay a bit more for each drink so
that those who are injured may be compensated.
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